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Ian Gough
The current stage of ‘neo-capitalism’ or ‘state monopoly capitalism’ is charac-
terized by a qualitatively expanded role of the state in capitalist social forma-
tions.1 One expression of this huge politico-economic weight of the modern 
state is the prolonged expansion in state expenditures, such that they now 
exceed one half of gross domestic product in contemporary Britain.2 Yet despite 
this, there have been only isolated studies by Marxists which systematically 
examine the causes and consequences of this unprecedented growth. In the 
following sections we propose to outline the patterns and trends in state ex-
penditure in the major capitalist economies; briefly to analyse the nature of the 
modern capitalist state and its socio-economic setting; in the light of this to 
attempt an explanation of the growth and composition of state expenditures; 
and finally to consider briefly some of the major economic and political conse-
quences of this phenomenon. Beforehand, however, it is incumbent on us to 
consider current theories and state why we regard them as unsatisfactory or 
incomplete. To this end, the recent studies of O’Connor, Yaffe and Barratt 
Brown will be singled out for attention.
State Expenditure in 
Advanced Capitalism
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I. Introduction: Critique of Existing Theories
The Fiscal Crisis of the State by James O’Connor3 is an important book 
representing the first systematic attempt by a Marxist to come to grips 
with the explosion of state expenditure since the Second World War. 
Its complexity means that any brief discussion will necessarily do it an 
injustice, and the reader is referred elsewhere to an extended review of 
it.4 Briefly, the growth of the state is, for O’Connor, both a cause and 
consequence of the expansion of monopoly capital. The growing 
socialization of production necessitates greater state intervention to 
ensure private accumulation and profitability; hence social capital ex-
penditures on roads, education, research and development, etc. This 
stimulates the development of productive capacity, notably in the 
monopoly sector of the economy, but demand for its products rises 
less fast bringing about tendencies to surplus capacity and surplus 
population. This in turn generates a further round of social expenses 
designed to generate demand but not add to capacity: surplus capital 
necessitates military expenditure and the surplus population requires 
an expansion of state functions in welfare relief, etc.5 The result is a 
two-fold growth of state expenditure: on indirectly productive social 
capital and on unproductive warfare-welfare expenses. This growth 
tends to a structural gap between state revenue and expenditure, or a 
fiscal crisis of the state. The outcome of this can take a variety of forms, 
the major one of which is inflation, the solutions to each creating 
further problems.
Whilst the first part of the argument (concerning the growth of social 
capital) is sound and whilst the whole is embellished with many power-
ful insights, the second part rests on two false ‘laws’ of Marxist political 
economy: the tendencies to immiseration of the working class and to 
underconsumption.6 The first is nowhere seriously entertained today, 
but the second continues to flourish, most notably in the USA where the 
influence of Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital continues strong.7 It 
thus represents in this respect a sophisticated version of their argument,
* My thanks are due to Robin Blackburn, Norman Geras, John Harrison, Geoff 
Hodgson and Bob Rowthorn for comments on an earlier draft.
1 The term ‘state monopoly capitalism’ is more precise than ‘neo-capitalism’ but 
suffers from the emphasis sometimes given to the ‘fusion’ of big monopolies and the 
state (see N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, London 1973, p. 273) and 
from the connotations of the ‘anti-monopoly’ alliance.
2 There are many other areas of intervention which do not entail direct state expendi-
ture. For an attempted classification see R. Murray, ‘Internationalization of capital 
and the nation state’, NLR 67, 1971; and for an excellent survey Bill Warren, ‘The 
state and capitalist planning’, NLR 72, 1972.
3 J. O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, New York, 1973.
4 I. Gough, ‘The fiscal crisis of the state’, Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Econo-
mists, 11, Summer 1975.
5 The result of this tendency is the Marcusian warfare-welfare state. Cf. ‘The welfare-
warfare state is one single phenomenon, and military and civilian expenditure cannot 
be reduced significantly at the expense of one another’ (O’Connor, op. cit., p. 236; 
also p. 151)—a prognostication long since falsified even in the USA (see Section II 
below).
6 On underconsumption: O’Connor, op. cit., pp. 24–5, 29; on immiseration: pp. 
162, 236–7.
7 At least on the evidence of O’Connor’s book. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly 
Capital, Harmondsworth 1968.
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and indeed of associated theories of the permanent arms economy.8 For 
Baran and Sweezy it was not the economic nature of arms spending 
which made it ideal for offsetting tendencies to underconsumption, but 
its political nature. Given the power structure of US monopoly capital-
ism there were powerful forces opposing the growth of Federal spend-
ing on civilian items,9 but there were no established private interests 
opposed to the expansion of the military establishment, which moreover 
had other functional consequences for monopoly capital. O’Connor on 
the other hand correctly recognizes the productive contributions of 
many other state activities today. But for him, precisely because they 
augment productivity in the monopoly sector, they exacerbate the gap 
between this and the demand for its products, thus furthering the need 
for state expenses (welfare relief, etc.) to cope with the resulting surplus 
population. A dynamic interplay thus occurs as a result of the two con-
tradictory functions of the state—to aid private capital accumulation 
and to legitimize its social relations—but this is premised on the exis-
tence of tendencies to overproduction in the monopoly sector.
Functional Theories of the State
The errors of Marxist underconsumption and associated breakdown 
theories have been exposed elsewhere.10 These errors undermine all 
attempts to explain the growth of modern state expenditure as an offset 
to lack of demand elsewhere in the economy. The theory of the 
permanent arms economy—the most popular variant of undercon-
sumptionism—is not even in tune with the facts, since military spend-
ing has continually declined as a share of the total in all western coun-
tries since the early 1950s.11 Kidron’s attempt to resurrect it by demon-
strating that military spending acts instead as an offset to the falling 
tendency of the rate of profit has been refuted.12 More generally, all 
such theories suffer from two related weaknesses: the lack of a historical 
approach and a mechanistic distinction between the economic base and 
the superstructure, between objective and subjective factors. Purdy 
argues well against the first (in connection with the arms economy 
theory): ‘Attention is focused on the function of arms spending within 
an ongoing capitalist economy. The historical genesis of the arms 
economy is ignored . . . . The arms race is a historically specific feature 
of a particular stage of capitalist development. To confine analysis to 
an account of its functional role in modern capitalism is to fall into one 
of the basic methodological faults of bourgeois social science: the com-
plete failure to understand the present as history.’13
8 e.g. T. Cliff, ‘Perspectives of the permanent war economy’, A Socialist Review, 
London 1965.
9 Specifically: private and professional interests threatened by state intervention 
(e.g. real estate, the medical profession), the need to protect the existing benefits of 
the oligarchy (e.g. in education), and the danger of undermining the work ethic with 
social security schemes. Baran and Sweezy, op. cit., pp. 163–75, and P. Baran, The
Political Economy of Growth, Harmondsworth 1973, pp. 231–3.
10 Lenin long ago attacked the underconsumptionism of the Narodniks in The 
Development of Capitalism in Russia, 1964, ch. 1. For a recent critique see G. Hodgson, 
‘The permanent arms economy’, International, vol. 1, no. 8, 1973, pp. 56–8.
11 See section II below.
12 M. Kidron, Western Capitalism since the War, Harmondsworth 1970, p. 56. The 
best critique is D. Purdy, ‘The theory of permanent arms economy—a critique and 
an alternative’, CSEB Spring 1973.
13 Purdy, p. 23.
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The same argument applies to all theories of the state premised on 
‘breakdown’ theories of the economy. The associated error is a false 
polarization of the economy and the superstructure. The former is 
seen as an autonomous ‘factor’ leading, if unchecked, to some form of 
economic breakdown, whereas the latter is interpreted as a passive 
instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie whose functions are deter-
mined by the offsetting action required in order to avoid or check the 
tendencies to breakdown. We shall argue below that the capitalist state 
is characterized by a relative autonomy from the economic structure 
and is responsive to the ongoing struggle between and within the 
dominant and dominated classes. All this is in fact recognized by 
O’Connor,14 and this is the real merit of his book, but it coexists un-
easily with a functionalist view of the state stemming from his under-
lying analysis of the economy.
The same fundamental criticisms can be made of those analyses of state 
expenditures recently put forward by David Yaffe.15 For him, the 
growth of state expenditure represents part of the attempt to solve the 
crisis of profitability, brought about by the falling tendency of the rate 
of profit under late capitalism. ‘It is precisely the crisis of profitability 
that makes a growing state expenditure necessary.’16 More specifically, 
state expenditure has been functional in maintaining social and political 
stability since the war, in supplementing private investment and in 
maintaining full employment. But this state intervention has a contra-
dictory impact for it subsequently (a) reduces private accumulation and 
(b) fuels inflation. The first results because all or most state expenditure 
(including that on the purchase of goods and services from the capital-
ist sector) is ‘unproductive’. It constitutes a deduction from the surplus 
value produced by ‘productive’ workers and reduces the amount avail-
able for private capital accumulation. The second follows from both the 
‘unproductiveness’ of the expenditure and the way it is financed: 
‘government expenditure requires, indeed necessitates, deficit financing 
and increased borrowing which leads to inflation.’17
There are many errors in this argument. First, it gives insufficient 
weight to the role of class struggle in shaping state- especially social-
expenditures, and erroneously regards them all as ‘unproductive’. Many 
can better be regarded as a part of the value of labour power collec-
tively provided rather than a ‘cost that capital must pay for social 
stability etc.’18 which is deducted from surplus value already produced. 
If this is so these services are not luxuries, but part of Marx’s depart-
ment II (producing the material elements of variable capital) as 
O’Connor correctly emphasizes, and are indirectly productive of sur-
14 See O’Connor, op. cit., p. 2 and ch. 9 on the role of class struggle, and ch. 3 for a 
profound analysis of the state and budgetary control.
15 D. Yaffe, ‘The Marxian theory of crisis, capital and the state’, CSEB Winter 1972, 
and ‘The crisis of profitability’, NLR 80, 1973.
16 Yaffe, NLR 80, p. 51ff.
17 Ibid., p. 52. Which of these two factors crucially determines the inflationary im-
pact of state expenditure is not clear. Mandel, with whom on many points Yaffe’s 
analysis shares a lot in common, recognizes that if the expenditure were entirely 
financed by taxation it would not be inflationary. Unfortunately he concludes: ‘Such 
a case is practically unknown in the epoch of the decline of capitalism,’ E. Mandel, 
Marxist Economic Theory, London 1968, p. 527.
18 Yaffe, NLR 80, p. 57, fn. 42.
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plus value.19 Second, as we show in the next section, it is not the case 
that the great expansion of state spending since the Second World War 
has been financed by government borrowing; instead taxation has 
grown in parallel. This does not reduce its inflationary impact but it 
does mean that inflation cannot be explained solely by the intervention 
of the capitalist state as a deus ex machina isolated from the class struggle. 
Third, and most fundamentally, the ‘law’ of the falling tendency of the 
rate of profit has been subject to definitive criticism following advances 
in Marxist political economy in recent years.20 It follows that the role of 
the modern capitalist state can no longer be explained as a functional 
response to the profitability crisis of late capitalism.21
Class Struggle and the State
Once again we find here the false polarity between objective economic 
laws and the subjective political response to them, the ‘divorce of 
materialism and history’ in Colletti’s words,22 and a conception of the 
modern state as determined by these functions. A Marxist theory of 
crisis must situate the class struggle at its heart. This is not to argue that 
there are no general laws of capitalist development (the laws of the con-
centration of capital or combined and uneven development are ex-
amples), but that all laws which mechanically posit a tendency to 
‘breakdown’ of whatever nature must no longer be given credence. 
Nor is it to deny that the actions of the modern state are not shaped by 
these material forces; merely that they are not determined by them 
without remainder.
Against this functional approach may be set those who emphasize the 
role of class struggle in the development particularly of social services 
since the Second World War. This was stressed by Wedderburn writing 
in 1965, though it must be recognized that the view of the welfare state 
as a repressive agency continues to flourish especially in much American 
writing.23 The most recent British attempt to analyse objectively the 
developments in state expenditure is by Barratt Brown,24 who provides 
an excellent summary of the major trends. However part of his expla-
nation is weakened by a quite un-Marxist over-emphasis on the auto-
nomy of the state from the dominant class(es) in the context of growing 
working class power. Quoting Engels, that ‘when the warring classes 
so nearly attain equilibrium that the state, ostensibly appearing as a 
mediator, assumes for the moment a certain independence in relation to
19 For a demonstration of this see section V below.
20 G. Hodgson, ‘The theory of the falling rate of profit’, NLR 84, 1974, and I. Steed-
man, ‘Value, price and profit’, NLR 90, 1975.
21 This is not to deny the inevitability of crises under capitalism, nor that profit-
ability is the basic determinant of the current crisis. See section V below.
22 L. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, London 1972, p. 66. Pp. 62–72 present an ex-
cellent critique of breakdown theories.
23 D. Wedderburn, ‘Facts and theories of the welfare state’ in The Socialist Register 
1965, ed. R. Miliband and J. Saville. Even Piven and Cloward in their informative 
study write: ‘The key to an understanding 0f relief-giving is in the functions it 
serves for the larger economic and political order . . . . Expansive relief policies are 
designed to mute civil disorder, and restrictive ones to reinforce work norms,’ 
F. Piven and R. Cloward, Regulating the Poor, London 1972, p. xiii.
24 M. Barratt Brown, From Labourism to Socialism, Nottingham 1972, especially ch. 3.
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both,’25 he suggests that British working-class organizations in the 
1970s could be moving in this direction. In other words, anxious to 
reject the crude Marxist view of the state as a passive representative of 
the interests of the bourgeoisie, he goes too far and effectively denies 
the structural link between the state and the dominant class.26
In section III we shall attempt a synthesis of these two views based on 
the recent works of Poulantzas and Miliband and in the light of that will 
propose a general theory to explain the growth and composition of 
state expenditures. But beforehand, we must consider those trends in 
some detail, since part of the confusion in this area rests on simple 
factual errors as to what has actually happened.
II. The Growth of the Capitalist State
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the structure and trends of total state ex-
penditure in the UK and the five other major OECD countries.27 In 1972
it amounted to 37–40 per cent of GDP in the major European economies, 
34 per cent in the USA and perhaps 20 per cent in Japan. Since the war, 
state spending has grown faster than GDP in every OECD country. From 
1955 to 1969 it rose 23 per cent faster in all countries taken together, 
with only France and Japan among the major economies exhibiting a 
slower relative growth (see bottom half of Table 1). This trend has 
continued up to 1972. Of course the divergent rates of growth of these 
economies has meant that the absolute growth of state spending has 
varied enormously. On this count it has grown most rapidly in Japan: 
50 per cent faster than the EEC and twice as fast as the UK.28 Taking the 
growth of public expenditure in the UK over a longer time period, it 
can be seen there have been three major periods of expansion. The first 
occurred during the First World War when its share of GNP (at factor 
cost) doubled to between 25 per cent and 30 per cent in the inter-war 
period. During the Second World War, the economic role of the state 
rose to record levels (three quarters of GNP in 1943), but at the end of
25 F. Engels, The Origin of the Family, the State and Private Property. Moscow 1940, 
p. 194.
26 Barratt Brown quotes in this context a remark by Miliband concerning a ‘second-
ary view’ of the state in Marx and Engels as ‘independent from and superior to all 
social classes, as being the dominant force in society rather than the instrument of a 
dominant class’, despite Miliband’s clear critique of the passage by Engels quoted 
above: ‘For Marx, the Bonapartist state, however independent it may have been 
politically from any given class, remains, and cannot in a class society but remain, the 
protector of an economically and socially dominant class’, R. Miliband, ‘Marx and 
the state’, The Socialist Register 1965, pp. 283, 285.
27 The two tables are not comparable. Table 1 excludes capital expenditure of state 
productive enterprises, i.e. it measures total government rather than public expendi-
ture. It also excludes capital transfers. In Table 1 the items are expressed as a percent-
age of GDP at purchasers’ values, in Table 2 of GNP at factor cost. The purchasers’ 
values/factor cost distinction is crucial since the latter excludes the artificial inflation 
of national output brought about by the imposition of indirect taxes, notably on 
consumer items, which raises their market price. Since the burden of indirect taxes 
on government expenditure is small, the procedure in Table 2 gives a more accurate 
impression of the relative weight of state expenditure. Gross National Product 
differs from Gross Domestic Product by including net property income paid or 
received from abroad; but the difference is slight.
28 OECD, ‘Public expenditure trends’ (by M. Garin-Painter) in Occasional Studies, July 
1970, Table 1, p. 45.
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TABLE 1
State Expenditure1 in Major OECD Countries
WEST
UK FRANCE GERMANY ITALY USA JAPAN
Per cent of GDP2 in 1972:
Military 4.9 3.5 3.0 2.4 6.7
+Health and education 7.7 5.7 7.1
+Other civilian 6.1
8.8 14.7
6.7 7.0
=Current real expenditure 18.7 12.3 17.7 14.8 20.8 9.1
+Capital expenditure 4.7 3.1 3.7 2.6 3.2
=Total real expenditure 23.4 15.4 21.4 17.4 24.0
+Social security 8.9 17.2 13.0 14.6 8.0 4.7
+Debt interest 3.8 0.8 1.0 2.9 1.9 o.8
+Other transfers and subsidies 3.7 3.3 2.6 5.1 0.4
=TOTAL EXPENDITURE3 39.8 36.7 38.0 40.0 34.3
TOTAL REVENUE4 37.9 38.0 39.0 34.7 31.4 22.6
State borrowing5 1.8 –0.5 0.1 6.5 0.3
Ratio of growth rates to growth
of GNP, 1955–1969:6
Military 0.62 0.44 0.84 1.22 0.80
All civilian 1.36 1.20 1.34 1.13 1.65
Current real expenditure 1.09 0.92 1.22 1.15 1.23 0.92
Capital expenditure 1.41 1.51 1.22 0.71 1.15
Social security 1.59 1.32 1.19 1.37 1.47 1.10
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 1.24 1.14 1.24 1.20 1.23
Current expenditure at constant prices: 1.62 o.58 0.85 0.74 1.o6 0.55
1 Excluding state productive enterprises.
2 At market prices.
3 Excluding capital transfers.
4 All taxation, including social security contributions and local taxes, government trading income and 
current transfers.
5 Equals expenditure – revenue ± capital transfers. 
6 France 1959–69, West Germany 1960–69.
SOURCES: OECD, National Accounts 1961–1972, 1974; OECD, Expenditure Trends in OECD Countries, 1960–1980, 1972.
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TABLE 2
State Expenditure1 in the UK, 1910–1973
1910 1937 1951 1961 1971 1973
Per cent of GNP2 in each year:
Social security 5.2 5.3 6.7 8.9 8.7
Health and welfare 1.8 4.5 4.4 5.8 5.9
Education 2.6 3.2 4.2 6.5 6.8
Housing 1.4 3.1 2.3 2.6 3.5
Total social services 4.2 10.9 16.1 17.6 23.8 24.9
Environment3 1.5 1.6 2.4 2.5
Transport and communications
0.7 1.0
2.1 3.2 3.9 3.9
Commerce and industry4 1.8 2.8 6.9 4.9 6.5 5.6
Justice and laws 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.4
Military and external 3.5 5.0 10.8 7.6 6.6 6.4
Debt interest and other 1.9 5.2 6.9 6.3 5.9 5.8
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 12.7 25.7 44.9 42.1 50.3 50.5
Total taxation 11.0 22.5 37.5 32.8 41.8 37.7
Trading surpluses, rent, interest 1.3 5.2 5.7 6.8 6.9
TOTAL REVENUE 11.0 23.8 42.7 38.5 48.6 44.6
Borrowing requirement6 1.7 1.9 2.2 3.6 1.7 5.9
1 Including capital expenditure of public corporations.
2 At factor cost.
3 Water, sewerage and refuse disposal; public health, clean air, parks, town and country planning etc.
4 Employment services, research and development, investment grants, agricultural support, and certain public 
corporations’ investment.
5 Police, prisons, law courts and Parliament.
6 Plus other financial transactions (a residual item).
SOURCES: A. Peacock and D. Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the UK, London 1961; London and 
Cambridge Economic Service, The Britisb Economy: Key Statistics 1900–1970; CSO, National Income and Expenditure 
and Social Trends.
60
} {
hostilities it settled down to a much higher plateau than before, account-
ing for about two-fifths of GNP. The third period of expansion did not 
begin in the UK until the early 1960s (during the 1950s its share fell 
somewhat), but since then it has proceeded without interruption to 
take the share of total public expenditure over 50 per cent of GNP in the 
late 1960s.
This rapid expansion since the Second World War has not been financed 
by a secular increase in state borrowing, with the crucial exception of 
the USA. From the mid 1950s to the late 1960s taxation in all OECD
countries combined rose by 4.7 per cent of GNP—faster than the rise in 
all current expenditure if the USA is excluded, and not much below the 
rise in total expenditure including capital investment.29 In this context 
it should be remembered that some state capital expenditure provides 
assets which yield a trading income, for which therefore loan finance is 
not necessarily inflationary: hence, it is reasonable to expect taxation to 
cover only part of capital spending. Data for the UK in Table 2 shows 
that up to 1971 taxation plus trading surpluses rose roughly in line with 
expenditure. Since 1971 deficits have mushroomed in the UK, Italy and 
several other countries but this in no way disturbs our conclusions on 
the long run trend in state finance: there are specific conjunctural ex-
planations of this new ‘fiscal crisis of the state’.30 Alongside this long-
run growth in tax revenues there has been a marked shift in their 
burden away from corporations and onto households in all countries:31
an important point to which we return later.
Trends
Turning to the composition of state expenditure, certain trends are 
clearly discernible in all advanced capitalist countries. These are: the 
growth in expenditure on the social services, certain infra-structure 
items and aid to private industry, and the decline in the share absorbed 
by armaments. Of these ‘the most striking feature is the extent to which 
education, health and social security were responsible for the rising 
share of government expenditure over this period’ according to an 
OECD report.32 In the UK the social services (including housing) have 
expanded continuously since the beginning of the century, with the 
exception of the 1930s, and today account for one half of public ex-
penditure. In the US they increased from 9 per cent of GNP in 1955 to 
15 per cent in 1969. In the EEC social expenditure rose as a percentage of 
private consumption from 1962–70; in the Netherlands a huge increase 
from 22 per cent to 35 per cent.33 Parallel with this expansion has been
29 Current spending rose by 4.4 per cent of GNP (4.9 per cent including the USA) and 
total spending by 5.0 per cent (5.5 per cent including the USA). OECD, Expenditure 
Trends in OECD Countries 1960–1980, 1972, Tables 16, 19. In these and subsequent 
calculations, countries are weighted by their aggregate GNPs at current exchange 
rates. In 1967–9 this gave the USA a weight of 51 per cent and the other five major 
countries a weight of 34 per cent of the OECD total.
30 And for the aberrant behaviour 0f the US. O’Connor (p. 43) attributes the growing 
government deficit in the 1960s to the unpopularity of the war in South East Asia 
which prevented the imposition 0f tax increases to finance it.
31 OECD, 1972, p. 56. 
32 OECD, 1970, p. 48.
33 OECD, 1972, pp. 72–81 for a detailed comparative analysis.
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the ubiquitous decline in military spending relative to GNP. From the 
mid 1950s to the late 1960s its share fell from 7.1 per cent to 6.2 per cent 
of GNP in all OECD countries combined; from 4.1 per cent to 3.2 per cent 
if the US is excluded.34 Since then this tendency has if anything intensi-
fied with a major drop in the US from 9 per cent to below 7 per cent in 
1972 and in Italy, from 4 per cent to 21_2 per cent. Other major develop-
ments since the Second World War have been a growth in ‘environ-
mental’ and infra-structure expenses, transport and roads, and a rela-
tive decline in agricultural support. Comparable data on these and 
other items is harder to come by but the trends in the UK revealed in 
Table 2 are probably common to all advanced capitalist economies.35
Two further notable increases also occurred in the 1960s: a growth in 
state economic aid to the private sector and a growth in state expendi-
ture on its legal and coercive apparatus. The decline in expenditure on 
‘commerce and industry’ since 1971 does not represent a real decline in 
the former item. Instead direct investment grants have been replaced 
by tax allowances to corporations, a change which leaves unaltered the 
impact on total state finances, and which reveals the pitfalls in extra-
polating figures on expenditure to reveal the total economic impact of 
the modern state.
By no means does all state spending pre-empt resources and reduce the 
total available for the private sector. This is only the case with real 
(current and capital) spending, such as on arms or education services. 
The remaining money transfers do just that: they merely transfer the 
ability to purchase resources to other groups, whether individual 
households (e.g. pensions or family allowances) or private firms (e.g. 
investment grants). They thus add to private purchasing power, just as 
the taxes to finance them subtract from it. Table I shows that for the 
major OECD countries real expenditure accounted for between 42 per 
cent of total spending in Italy and 70 per cent in the USA. In most OECD
countries it was transfer expenditure which rose most rapidly be-
tween 1955 and 1969. For all OECD countries combined it grew 42 per 
cent faster than GNP, whereas real state expenditure rose only 16 per cent 
faster (8 per cent faster if the US is excluded) and total state spending 
23 per cent faster.36 Almost everywhere this has been due to the de-
cline in arms spending, since real civilian expenditure continued to 
grow throughout this period. In the UK, total real expenditures actually 
fell as a share of GNP in the 1950s, and this trend has continued since 
then in France and Japan (see bottom half of Table 1). So the rapid 
growth of the state since the Second World War has not significantly 
reduced the share of growing resources available for private consump-
tion, investment or exports. Rather it has been utilized to raise the 
share of the last two in particular—noticeably so in the last few years as 
profit rates have been squeezed.
Structures
Of course, despite the similarity in trends, the structures of state expendi-
ture still differ substantially between the major OECD countries. In 
34 Ibid., table 16.
35 See OECD, 1970, p. 53.
36 OECD, 1972, table 17. 
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general one can distinguish three groups of countries: the US and UK, 
the EEC countries and Japan. The US and UK are characterized by 
higher military and lower social security spending than the EEC. Partly 
because of this the share of public expenditure which pre-empts real 
resources is higher in the US and UK, accounting for almost one quarter 
of GDP (Table 1). Since interest on the National Debt is also more 
burdensome there, the total of ‘war related expenditure’ is also higher 
than in the EEC, and total social spending is markedly lower (especially 
in the USA until recent years).37 Japan is in a category of its own, the 
state spending less than any other OECD country with the exception of 
Spain and Portugal. These differences are matched by variations in the 
structure of state revenues. Not surprisingly the high social security 
benefits in the EEC are matched by higher social security contributions, 
though in France especially these are mostly paid by employers. In the 
UK and US personal income taxation is higher and in the US corporation 
tax is still significant; social security contributions are much lower. In 
Japan taxes of all kinds are very low: less than two-thirds of the OECD
average.38 These different patterns of expenditure and revenue reflect 
of course the very different historical antecedents and processes in each 
nation state (the high war-related expenditures of the UK even today 
reminding us of its past global role). On the other hand the similarity 
in trends mean that these differences are diminishing and the structures 
of expenditure are ‘converging’ in all advanced capitalist countries.
Two further points should be emphasized when interpreting data on 
state spending. First, part, even of real expenditure, consists of purchases 
of goods and services from the capitalist sector, for example arms, 
drugs, books, building construction etc. In the UK at the present time 
this amounts to one third of current real expenditure, the remaining 
two thirds representing the wages of state employees, whether soldiers, 
teachers or doctors. Ten per cent of the output of UK manufacturing 
industry (and a much higher proportion in certain sectors, e.g. aero-
space) is purchased by the central government alone.39 Not all state 
expenditure represents state production.
Secondly, trends in productivity in the state sector must also be con-
sidered, for it is well known that this rises less fast than in the capitalist 
sector, due to the predominance of low productivity, labour-intensive 
services in the former, particularly the social services. As a result the 
cost index of state services has risen faster than the average and a 
greater level of expenditure is required year by year in all countries 
just to maintain the level of services in real terms. Thus state consump-
tion expenditure, which in money terms has risen faster than GNP in the 
OECD as a whole has in constant price terms risen more slowly (see 
Table I, last line). Excluding the USA (where it was boosted by military 
spending in the 1960s) state consumption rose by 3.9 per cent p.a. in 
real terms in all OECD countries from 1955–69, whilst GNP rose by
37 T. Hill, ‘Too much consumption’, National Westminster Bank Review, November 
1969.
38 OECD, 1972, Table 19, and cso, Social Trends No. 5, 1974, Table 210.
39 T. Chester, ‘Public money in the private sector’, National Westminster Bank Review, 
May 1973, p. 24.
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5.7 per cent.40 In other words real state consumption expenditure has 
fallen as a share of GNP over the last two decades. Admittedly this is 
more than accounted for by the decline in military spending, and social 
transfers have continued to rise, but the point remains. For slow grow-
ing economies such as the British, it can mean that a rising proportion 
of GNP must be expanded each year in order merely to protect the social 
services against the inflation in their costs.41 As we shall see, this 
phenomenon has contributed to the recent crisis of social expenditure 
in the UK and elsewhere.
III. The Capitalist State and Capitalist Economy
In this section we shall attempt to present the essential characteristics of 
the capitalist state and to situate it in the current stage of the capitalist 
world economy. For the first task we shall draw heavily on the recent 
major studies of Poulantzas and Miliband.42 Though there are very 
important differences indeed between their analyses,43 it is the common 
area of agreement in their work which is of most significance for the 
purposes of this essay. The state, as institutionalized political power, 
consists of the interrelationship of the following six institutions: the 
executive, legislature, administration, military and police, judiciary and 
‘sub-central’ government.44 For both Poulantzas and Miliband the 
capitalist state is a relatively autonomous entity representing the 
political interests of the dominant classes and situated within the field of 
class struggle. Let us consider each of these characteristics in turn.
Autonomy of the State
First, the capitalist state is relatively autonomous, both from the economic 
structures of capitalist social formations and from the politically 
dominant classes in those social formations.45 The latter point is 
crucial: not since the patriciates of Venice and Lübeck have business-
men governed directly as a class.46 This has been so because of the 
structural position of the state within capitalist social formations. It is 
the incapacity of the capitalist classes to organize itself as a political 
force which requires the state to step in and realize its political hege-
mony, to act as a class conscious political directorate.47 This incapacity
40 OECD, 1972, Tables 2, 3. ‘State consumption’ refers to current real expenditure in 
Table 1.
41 For example, expenditure on the National Health Service in the UK which rose as a 
share of GNP at current prices (see Table 2) actually fell at constant prices from 3.9
per cent in 1951 to 3.4 per cent in 1971.
42 N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, London 1973; R. Miliband, The 
State in Capitalist Society, London 1969.
43 See the debate in NLR 58 (1969) and 59 (1970). In particular the criticisms by 
Miliband in ‘Poulantzas and the capitalist state’, NLR 82, 1973 are persuasive.
44 Miliband,1969, pp. 49–54.
45 e.g. Poulantzas, p. 282; Miliband, 1973, p. 85. 
46 Miliband, 1969, p. 53.
47 Poulantzas, pp. 284–5, 188–9. See also O’Connor, p. 67ff. Miliband (1973, pp. 
88–9) has criticized Poulantzas for ignoring the effective role played by bourgeois 
political parties (themselves outside the state system proper) in organizing and 
articulating the interests of the dominant class and its supporting classes. This is 
correct, but does not preclude the various institutions of the state, in particular the 
civil service, aiding the parties in this role, as Miliband himself demonstrates (1969, 
ch. 5).
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is due to two major factors. First, the existence of different factions 
within the dominant class, for example industrial and financial capital 
in the UK, and/or of different classes within the dominant bloc (land-
lords and capitalists), necessitates the existence of an ‘external’ institu-
tion representing the common, longer term, political interests of the 
dominant class(es) as a whole.48 Without this they would degenerate 
into special-interest lobbying. Second, and more important, political 
unity is essential in the political conflict with the dominated classes 
particularly in the context of bourgeois democracy, the most pervasive 
form of class rule particularly since the Second World War. To this 
end, the state plays a crucial role in politically disabling the dominated 
classes by setting itself up as the representative of ‘national unity’, of 
the ‘general interests’ of ‘the people’ as a whole.49 This of course is 
powerfully legitimized by the existence of universal suffrage and the 
attendant bourgeois ‘freedoms’ in all major advanced capitalist coun-
tries, particularly when social democratic governments are in office. 
These two factors, then, mean that the capitalist state simultaneously 
acts to organize the dominant classes as a political force and to politically 
disorganize the dominated classes. Both these functions however 
necessitate its autonomy from the dominant class itself: the first in 
order to realize its common interest, the second in order to effectively 
pose as the representative of national unity. The relative autonomy of 
the capitalist state is thus a structurally determined characteristic; it 
does not depend on an equilibrium of class forces, either within the 
dominant class(es), or between the dominant and dominated classes,50
as much contemporary political analysis suggests.
Second, given this autonomy, the capitalist state does constitute itself 
as the ‘unambiguous political power of the dominant class’. But it can 
only effectively represent its political interests by means of this relative 
autonomy, which requires it continually to challenge the short-term 
and even long-term economic interests of particular sections of capital. 
‘This relative autonomy allows the state to intervene not only in order 
to arrange compromises vis-a-vis the dominated classes, which, in the 
long run, are useful for the actual economic interests of the dominant 
classes or factions; but also (depending on the concrete conjuncture) 
to intervene against the long-term economic interests of one or other 
faction of the dominant class: for such compromises and sacrifices are 
sometimes necessary for the realization of their political class interests.’51
This ‘unstable equilibrium of compromise’ provides the basis for the 
whole series of social and economic reforms extracted by the working 
class in the post-war ‘welfare states’ of advanced capitalist societies, 
which yet leaves untouched the political power of capital and the 
repressive apparatus of the state on which it is ultimately based. This 
introduces at the centre of the analysis of the capitalist state the third
48 Poulantzas, pp. 284, 287; Miliband, 1973. p. 85, fn. 4.
49 Poulantzas, pp. 132–7, 277–9, 287, 288–9; Miliband, 1969, pp. 72–6; O’Connor, 
p. 69. For a lucid though brief exposition of the advantages and risks of bourgeois 
democracy for the capitalist class, see N. Geras, ‘Rosa Luxemburg after 1905’, NLR
89, 1975, pp. 13–16.
50 Poulantzas, pp. 260, 274, 287.
51 Poulantzas, p. 285, also p. 193; Miliband, 1969, p. 102.
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feature noted above: the political class struggle. This essentially deter-
mines the degree of autonomy which any particular state exhibits.52 The 
basic struggle at both the economic and political level today is of course 
that between capital and labour. In the political sphere the role of social 
democracy (and at particular conjunctures of communist parties) has 
been important especially since the Second World War. Social demo-
cracy is always involved in a tightrope act—balancing the concessions 
it can offer to its mass base on the one hand with the need to serve the 
political interests of capital on the other hand.53 So long as the conces-
sions are there to be given, ‘it can walk quite a way along this tightrope 
without actually falling off’;54 when the economy is in a downturn 
however its political survival is considerably more precarious. But all 
governments of whatever political complexion depend for their 
survival under bourgeois democracy on their ability to offer certain
reforms and concessions to the struggles of the dominated classes.55
Concentration of Capital
These states are operating within a determinate socio-economic con-
text: it would be quite antithetical to historical materialism to deny that 
there are objective laws of capitalist development which, within limits, 
operate independently of men’s will. These laws of development also 
impose certain functions on the capitalist state, though the response to 
these will depend on the individual social formation and state. Two 
have had a major impact on the role of the modern state: the accumula-
tion and centralization of capital, and the law of combined and uneven 
development which follows from it.
The inbuilt tendencies for capital to accumulate and to be concentrated 
in fewer and larger units are central aspects of Marx’s analysis of 
capitalist society. Capitalist competition in the context of rapid tech-
nological development ensures the continued concentration into fewer 
and larger corporations and units of production.56 The direct conse-
quences of this include a growth in the ratio of means of production to 
direct labour, the ‘deepening’ of capital, an increasing span of time 
separating the original decision to produce and the final output, greater 
inflexibility of capital commitment, a massive infusion of technology 
into the productive process, and more and more complex corporate 
organization and planning.57 These trends have numerous consequences 
for the modern capitalist state, ranging from research and develop-
ment to guarantees of profitability, financial aid for investment and the 
attempt to provide a ‘total favourable environment’ for monopoly 
capital by means of capitalist planning.58
52 Poulantzas, p. 289.
53 For an excellent analysis of social democracy see Miliband, 1969, p. 96ff and his 
book Parliamentary Socialism, London 1972.
54 J. Harrison, ‘British capitalism in 1973 and 1974: the deepening crisis’, CSEB
Spring 1974, p. 55.
55 Miliband, 1969, pp. 102, 187.
56 For a good international survey see Mandel, op. cit., ch. 12.
57 This list is adapted from that in J. K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Har-
mondsworth 1974, ch. 2. For Galbraith they are all the results of the ‘imperatives of 
technology’ not 0f capitalist social relations of production.
58 Warren, NLR 72, and Mandel, op. cit., pp. 498–507.
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But accumulation and concentration of capital has, ever since the In-
dustrial Revolution, brought in its train other upheavals in the socio-
economic structure of an epochal nature. Three are crucial for an under-
standing of the role of the state in advanced capitalist countries. First, 
the continuous proletarianization of the population as capital spreads 
its influence to all sectors of the economy is a feature of every capitalist 
society. As a result, the proportion of the self-employed, peasants and 
small farmers, independent professionals, etc., continues to fall in every 
capitalist economy whilst the share of employees continues to rise.59
This trend towards a common proletarian status, whatever the income 
differentials and despite the high absolute living standards especially of 
certain salaried workers, has important consequences especially in the 
field of welfare provision. For the security provided by family produc-
tion and the possession of a minimum quantum of means of produc-
tion is no longer present. As a result collective provision often by the 
state is more and more necessary, especially since industrialization 
creates new ‘diswelfares’ (industrial diseases) and further sources of in-
security (redundancy and shake-out).60 Second, the quality of labour 
power must necessarily be raised in all capitalist economies to match the 
increased sophistication of production and of its attendant social pro-
cesses. Side by side with investment in instruments of production, in-
vestment in labour power has grown apace especially in the twentieth 
century,61 and this has again necessitated the intervention of the 
capitalist state. Lastly, the urbanization process is, in the capitalist 
epoch, a major consequence of the tendencies to capital accumulation 
and concentration. In all countries conurbations and other urban 
areas (including their suburbs) continue to grow, whilst regional and 
sub-regional areas expand and contract in an uneven way. This historic 
process has major implications for state intervention. It necessitates on 
the one hand state physical planning: land use, town and country 
planning, regional programmes, etc.; and on the other hand a rapid 
growth in infrastructural investment in housing, roads, transport, 
water, sewerage, gas, electricity, parks, city centres, clean air, etc., etc., 
most of which can again only be undertaken directly by the state or 
indirectly by its agencies.62
Accumulation and concentration of capital, proletarianization and 
education of the labour force and the population generally, and urban-
ization: these then are the major ongoing trends in the socio-economic 
structures of capitalism. Together they are all aspects of the socializa-
tion of production—the inevitable corollary of the development of 
the capitalist mode of production. As we shall see, in all advanced 
capitalist countries, they have resulted in a growing socialization of the 
costs of production in the shape of growing state expenditures.
Combined and Uneven Development
The ‘law’ of combined and uneven development begins from the fact 
59 See A. Glyn and B. Sutcliffe, British Capitalism, Workers and the Profits Squeeze, Har-
mondsworth 1972, appendix G for post-war data.
60 O’Connor, p. 124ff. Also R. M. Titmuss, Commitment to Welfare, London 1968, chs. 
5, 10, 11.
61 J. Sheehan, The Economics of Education, London 1973, ch. 1.
62 O’Connor, chs. 4–6
67
that capitalism is a world system, based on international division of 
labour and world-wide development of productive forces. Nation 
states are not totally autonomous entities but elements of this system, 
and the destiny of any individual country cannot be considered in 
isolation from developments elsewhere. ‘The historical dialectic 
knows neither naked backwardness nor chemically pure progressive-
ness. It is all a question of concrete correlations. The present day 
history of mankind is full of “paradoxes”, not so colossal as the arising 
of a proletarian dictatorship in a backward country, but of similar 
historical type.’63 One might restate the law by saying that nothing in 
history is a ‘paradox’: everything is explicable historically. How then 
has the operation of this law revealed itself since the Second World 
War, and what are the implications for the capitalist states of today?
On a world scale three developments have been crucial. First the ex-
pansion and strengthening of the Soviet bloc, followed in 1949 by the 
successful Chinese revolution. These developments have narrowed the 
global base for capitalist exploitation, and resulted very soon after the 
end of hostilities in the Cold War and the arms race. Second, the 
appearance of liberation struggles throughout the Third World which 
have further challenged imperialist domination. These have gained 
strength from the existence of the Soviet and Chinese states who have 
objectively been driven to support them even though their policies 
have often worked against them. The third factor is the total hegemony 
of the United States amongst the capitalist nations emerging from the 
aftermath of the Second World War.64 But recently this is being chal-
lenged, on the economic and political if not the military plane, as inter-
imperialist rivalries intensify. The rapid recovery and growth of 
Germany, the other EEC countries and Japan, is leading to a situation 
where there are three centres of imperialism in the contemporary 
world, not one.65 The prolonged period of US hegemony was a con-
tributory factor in the growth and stability of the post-war era, provid-
ing for example a stable international monetary framework within which 
progressively liberalized trade could take place. The economic chal-
lenge to the US has already disrupted this system and has contributed to 
the first synchronized boom and the deepest recession since the war.
It is the resonance of these global trends on the nature of advanced 
capitalist societies and in particular on the nature and role of their 
states with which we are chiefly concerned here. Here the major conse-
quence has undoubtedly been the absence of massive unemployment 
(and of internecine trade warfare and zero or slow growth) since the 
Second World War. This is primarily due to the political unacceptability of 
a reversion to the capitalism of the thirties given the example of the 
Soviet economies and the unfavourable (for capitalism) shift in the 
balance of world forces. The experience of full employment and wide-
63 L. Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, London 1967, vol. 3, p. 350. For 
his statement of the ‘law’ see vol. 1, ch. 3 and vol. 3, appendix II.
64 D. Horowitz provides a concise summary and percipient analysis of the post-war 
world in Imperialism and Revolution, Harmondsworth 1971, chs. 9–12. However he 
fails to note the challenge to US hegemony posed by the growing strength of other 
capitalist powers: pp. 246–7.
65 E. Mandel, Europe versus America?, London 1970, and B. Rowthorn, ‘Imperialism: 
unity or rivalry?’, NLR 69, 1971.
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spread state planning during the Second World War contributed to 
these rising expectations among the western working class. In the same 
way the greater security enjoyed by many during wartime, despite the 
absolute fall in living standards, made demands for extended state 
intervention in the field of social welfare irresistible. To this the high 
peace-time level of arms expenditure brought about by the Cold War 
and wars of liberation added a further stimulus. But the primary cause 
was the political necessity for capitalist states to avoid a return to 
slumps of the interwar scale, and their ability to implement this by 
means of Keynesian policies.66
Class Struggle since the War
This change in trajectory occurred despite the international defeat of 
working-class struggles after the Second World War. Unlike the turbu-
lent years following 1918, this struggle took a bourgeois political form 
with the entry of social democratic or communist parties into govern-
ment in several major countries, but because of this the movements 
were more open to, and soon weakened by, their reformist leadership. 
The ejection of communist ministers from the French and Italian post-
war coalitions and the defeat of the British Labour Party in 1951 were 
paralleled by the defeat of the Japanese general strike of 1947, the West 
German defeats of 1947–52 and the victory of McCarthyism in the US
(where an upsurge of strike activity took place in 1946). But despite 
these setbacks, the political constraints on the capitalist class in the 
west were, (if loosened somewhat) not removed: the underlying world 
balance of power had not ‘improved’, indeed in 1949 it ‘worsened’ con-
siderably. A ‘post-war settlement’ between capital and labour was 
essential to lay the basis for (what later transpired to be) the unpre-
cedented boom of the next two decades. In this the social democratic 
and communist parties in power played a crucial role. By defusing 
militant pressure from below, by laying the basis for economic growth 
with selective nationalization and economic aid to private industry and 
by granting certain important welfare reforms, they ensured the re-
generation of capitalist social relations in the aftermath of war.67 Of 
course these ‘concessions’ reflected the relative strengths of the labour 
movements in these countries (by contrast with West Germany, for 
example) and undoubtedly they sometimes went further than the 
dominant class would have wished. Each nation experienced a unique 
combination of circumstances. In Britain, the experience of collective 
mobilization and widespread sacrifices brought about by modern total 
war, combined with the absence of military occupation, subsequent 
victory but economic weakening resulted in a landslide majority for 
the Labour Party, and gave to the British ‘Welfare State’ its unique 
ideology, one which persists in the British Labour movement to the 
present day. But this is not to deny that the policies of the 1945 Labour 
government should be seen primarily as (a culturally specific) part of the 
world wide ‘post-war settlement’ between capital and labour brought 
about by the changed international balance of class forces, and not as 
concessions forced from the state by militant working-class struggle.68
66 Purdy, op. cit., pp. 24–9.
67 Miliband, 1972, ch. 9; A. Calder, The People’s War, London 1971.
68 Glyn and Sutcliffe, op. cit., ch. 2.
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The relative strength of the labour movements has increased subse-
quently over the years with experience of prolonged full employment. 
Not until the 1960s did the labour movements in the major European 
countries begin utilizing the bargaining power derived from full em-
ployment substantially to raise the share of wages in national income.69
This in turn stimulated greater intervention by the state via incomes 
policies, planning, etc. ‘High employment policy . . . was a product of 
the fear of the political repercussions of a repetition of the mass un-
employment of the 1930s. Capitalist planning was, on the contrary, 
designed to deal with the economic, as much as the political, conse-
quences of high employment policies after the Second World War.’70
The changed balance of power on a world scale brought about a com-
mitment to full employment and greater state intervention on the part 
of all capitalist states, (though, as noted above at different tempos in 
individual countries). This ‘post-war settlement’ has subsequently 
strengthened the bargaining power of labour vis-a-vis capital. The shift 
in the internal balance of power is therefore the result of the changed 
state policies, rather than their cause. The ultimate cause was the inter-
national outcome of the Second World War, product of the operation 
of the law of combined and uneven development. Some implications 
of this for a theory of crisis are investigated in section V.
IV. Categories of State Expenditure
We shall now seek to apply the analysis of the capitalist state and capital-
ist world economy outlined in section III to explain the trends in state 
expenditure noted in section II. In general they can be viewed as the 
response of the state to the long-term trends within advanced capitalism, 
in combination with the international and internal balance of class 
forces. But to explain national differences and changes in the composi-
tion of expenditures we must first attempt to classify them.
O’Connor has provided the only serious and comprehensive Marxist 
attempt to categorize state expenditures, by allocating them to Marx’s 
departments of production.71 On this basis he discerns three categories: 
1. ‘Social investment consists of projects and services that increase the 
productivity of a given amount of labour power and, other factors being 
equal, increase the rate of profit.’ This is ‘social constant capital’.
2. ‘Social consumption consists of projects and services that lower the 
reproduction costs of labour and, other factors being equal, increase the 
rate of profit.’ This is ‘social variable capital’.
3. ‘Social expenses consist of projects and services which are required to 
maintain social harmony’72 (including here, rather oddly, warfare 
expenses).
It is apparent that these correspond to Marx’s three departments, pro-
ducing respectively the material elements of constant capital (means of 
69 For a comparative survey, Glyn and Sutcliffe, ch. 4.
70 Warren, op. cit., pp. 3–4.
71 K. Marx, Capital, vol. II, 1967, pp. 406–15. O’Connor makes no direct reference to 
Marx’s analysis, but it is apparent from his definitions.
72 O’Connor, p. 7. The language is extremely imprecise: ‘labour power’ should read 
‘labour’ in category 1 and vice versa in category 2.
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production), variable capital (wage goods) and luxuries. Hence social 
investment and social consumption expenditures are indirectly pro-
ductive of surplus value whereas social expenses are not (this will be 
precisely demonstrated in section V below). O’Connor immediately 
notes the problems in actually classifying expenditures in this way, 
since ‘nearly every state expenditure is part social investment, part 
social consumption, and part social expense’. However, he notes that 
in each case a ‘preponderant set of social forces’ determines the size 
and nature of that particular state intervention, and this enables us to 
classify the expenditure accordingly.73 Certainly, only on rare occasions 
can one allocate any particular expenditure unambiguously to one de-
partment. Water or transport services, for example, are a means of pro-
duction when utilized by industry, but consumption goods when 
utilized by households. Social security and health services are elements 
of variable capital when consumed by the productive workforce, but 
luxuries when consumed by the elderly or other unproductive groups 
(excepting children, who are the future workforce). Ultimately, there is 
no alternative to dividing each expenditure into the different categories 
on this basis, but this exercise is presently beyond us. The basis, how-
ever, will be not so much the forces instrumental in setting up the pro-
ject etc., as a material input-output analysis of their predominant use-
value.
In what follows we shall simply group expenditures very roughly into 
these three categories, according to what we estimate to be their pre-
dominant material characteristic, but no pretence at accuracy is made. 
In each we shall try to account for the trends and differences we have 
previously observed. No attempt will be made at an historical explana-
tion for each country: that is something beyond the scope of this essay, 
yet ultimately nothing short of a concrete analysis of the development 
of each social formation will suffice. Instead we shall concentrate on the 
impact of the common elements discussed in section III on the state 
spending of the major OECD countries. We have already seen that 
certain trends are common to all; and this method also gives us some 
understanding of the national variations still observable. No more than 
that is claimed for it. We shall consider the three groups in reverse 
order, since this roughly corresponds to the historical sequence of their 
appearance.
I. Military and associated services
Included here are external services, the police and judiciary and interest 
on the National Debt. These are the classic functions of all states, not 
only capitalist but also, for example, feudal. Expenditure to meet them 
has risen (as a share of GNP) in the long term since the nineteenth cen-
tury, reflecting the growing costs of expanding and later on protecting 
the interests of national capitals, and, since 1917, of capitalism as a 
world system. The major item here—military expenditure—is thus 
high by the standards of the past century, but as we have seen, has been 
falling in all countries since the war. This high ‘peace-time’ level re-
flects precisely the armed nature of this ‘peace’: the Cold War and the
73 O’Connor, p. 105; also p. 7.
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continual struggles for national liberation. The declining trend reflects 
the semi-successful détente with the Soviet bloc, the colonial with-
drawal plus the move to other forms of imperialist domination, and 
other pressing claims on government expenditure. Another feature of 
this expenditure is the wide variation between countries. The dominant 
position of military spending in the US is to be expected given its world 
hegemony; the relatively high level in the UK, on the other hand, testi-
fies to its past hegemony and the attempt until recently to pursue an 
‘international’ policy beneficial to British finance capital. In both 
countries too the existence of large professional armies is expensive.
The high ratio of National Debt interest in the UK also derives from its 
past policy, both directly and indirectly via the higher domestic interest 
rates it entailed. Though these state interest payments are a financial 
transfer and not a claim on real resources, they do require additional 
taxation to finance them. Consequently, taxation equivalent to 10 per 
cent GNP is pre-empted in Britain (and the US) simply to finance military 
and debt, i.e. war-related, expenditures, thus considerably restricting 
these states’ room for manoeuvre. This has led to calls for the other 
members of NATO to assume a more equal share of the burden, but so 
far this appears to have been unsuccessful (see Table 1, figures on 
growth rates in various countries). Expenditure on the police and 
judiciary is the only item in this category to have consistently increased 
since the war, at least in Britain (Table 2). This is a response both to the 
growing need for regulatory functions given the complexity of modern 
urban life (e.g. traffic control) and to the growing class and other 
antagonisms in these societies particularly since the mid-1960s. It is 
significant that in the UK, expenditure on police and prisons is planned 
to increase faster than average over the next five years.74
These then are the major items of state expenditure which can be 
categorized as luxury production: services entering neither directly nor 
indirectly into the value of labour power, but required because of the 
antagonistic nature of capitalism and all other forms of class society. 
Even here, however, there are problems of delimitation: some such 
services (e.g. law and order) may well be indirectly productive for 
capital. But a distinction must be drawn for the purpose of analysis 
between those state goods and services which provide a favourable 
framework for the operation of the capitalist sector and those which 
directly constitute its inputs.
2. The social services
By this term is meant state expenditure on income maintenance, educa-
tion, health and welfare and certain aspects of housing. It covers several 
economic categories: direct spending on current goods and services 
(education, health), capital expenditure (municipal housing, schools), 
transfers (pensions, family allowances, student grants) and subsidies 
(on food, housing). It is also difficult to separate out their material 
characteristics, since a substantial proportion benefit the ‘unproductive’ 
members of society, indeed the Welfare State can be seen primarily as a 
74 Public Expenditure to 1977–78, Cmnd. 5519, 1973. Table 1.
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redistribution within the working class as a whole from workers to 
dependents. However, the bulk of such expenditure clearly benefits 
those of working age or their children, whose cost of subsistence must 
be regarded as part of the value of labour power.75 We shall demonstrate 
below that housewives are also indirectly productive for capital, so that 
services benefiting them should also be included here.
For these reasons, we analyse all social services as inputs into the pro-
duction of labour power. The question which then arises is, why does 
the state collectively provide an increasing proportion of wage goods 
in every capitalist society today? The answer to this question, essen-
tially querying the origin of the ‘Welfare State’, is necessarily complex. 
Broadly it reflects the impacts of both sets of factors discussed in our 
previous analysis: the ‘demands’ of contemporary capitalism and the 
state of the class struggle. For the purposes of exposition, we shall 
analyse each in turn, before considering their interrelation.
Social Needs under Capitalism
First, the role of the capitalist state in ensuring the adequate reproduc-
tion and maintenance of labour power, the sine qua non of capitalist pro-
duction, has been apparent since the earliest Factory and Public Health 
Acts in Britain. Since then, the trend towards more wage-labour, greater 
urbanization, the geographical movement of the population and the 
break-up of the extended family have all intensified the need for collec-
tive provision against insecurity.76 Furthermore, capitalist industriali-
zation increases the sources of insecurity and dependence (for example, 
unemployment, industrial injury and disease) and necessitates the state 
provision of certain services to compensate the casualties for their 
suffering.77 Sanitary conditions which would be acceptable in rural 
areas are a danger to public health in the towns. Wars have often pro-
vided a stimulus to these services, throwing light on the condition of 
recruits and social conditions generally, and raising fears about ‘national 
efficiency’. The poverty of the working class revealed in the Boer War 
and the campaign for ‘national physical efficiency’ was instrumental in 
introducing school meals and medical inspection of school children in 
1906 and 1907.78 Of decisive importance in the twentieth century, of 
course, has been the state’s active role in improving the quality of labour 
power, not only by means of education, but also via health services, 
housing policy, family allowances and other social policies. This has 
followed, first, the growing complexity of the production process and 
its need for skilled labourers, scientists, technologists, planners, ad-
ministrators and so forth. And second, often overlooked, the growing 
complexity of all aspects of social life: everything from travel to filling 
in tax forms demands a greater degree of knowledge and adaptability. 
75 The most recent data on the UK is to be found in D. Wedderburn, ed., Poverty, 
Inequality and Class Structure, London 1974, chs. 2, 3.
76 O’Connor, pp. 124–5.
77 Titmuss, op. cit., chs. 5, 10, 11
78 B. Gilbert, The Evolution of National Insurance in Great Britain, London 1966, chs. 
2, 3; J. Hay, The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms 1906—1914, London 1975. On 
the role of the two world wars see R. Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, 1950; A. 
Peacock and D. Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the UK, London 1961, 
Introduction and ch. 2.
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Furthermore, many of these needs are complementary, so that develop-
ments in education for example lead to demands for improved housing 
or health.
Since the Second World War, there has occurred a dislocation of many 
aspects of social relations in the advanced capitalist countries, which has 
thrown new burdens on the state. To take just one example, there are 
in Britain today over one million children living with only one parent 
as a result of increasing marriage breakdown.79 These new social needs 
reflect the great change in values and life-styles occasioned by the post-
war boom.80 Ultimately they are determined by the central contradic-
tion within capitalist societies between the forces and relations of pro-
duction. Within the framework of capitalism they can only be amelior-
ated by the wider penetration of the state into domains previously the 
exclusive preserve of the family.81
The reasons for greater state intervention are several. Partly it is essential 
in the nature of the service: some are collective or semi-collective goods 
which it pays no individual capitalist to supply since the benefits will 
be derived by his competitors (e.g. industrial training). Even then one 
must distinguish state provision and state finance of private providers. 
The latter maintains the capitalist sector, indeed by providing secure 
finance and an assured demand, often enhances its profitability. But 
this often leads to escalating costs, due both to fraud and private 
profit-taking and to the inefficiency and wastefulness of unregulated 
production. For this reason the state, representing the interests of 
capital as a class, may step in against the interests of that specific capital 
and provide the service directly at a lower cost (see section V below). 
An example of these alternatives is provided by a comparison of health 
services in the US and UK. In the US a part-private service is increasingly 
funded by the Federal government: it provides a poorer service at 
much greater cost than the centralized National Health Service in the 
UK. The extent to which this will result in a growing state intervention 
and expenditure will depend on the relation of class forces and the 
nature of the state: in particular the extent to which the parties, the 
executive and the administration can act in the interest of the class as a 
whole, and how far the state (in particular the legislature) is susceptible 
to pressure groups representing the interests of specific sections of 
capital. 82 We would expect it to be greater in centralized states, such as 
Britain or France, than in Federal states like the US. Even in the former, 
however, powerful interests, such as the pensions lobby in the UK, can 
prevent any serious inroads by the state. These account for some of the 
international differences we observe, but everywhere the process of the 
socialization of production results in a growth of social expenditure.
Role of Labour Movements
The second factor in this trend has been the effect of the ‘post-war 
79 Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families, 1974.
80 E. Hobsbawm speculates on the effects of the post-war boom on consumption 
patterns and popular culture in Industry and Empire, Harmondsworth 1969, pp. 164, 
281–4.
81 See E. Wilson, Women and the Welfare State, London 1974, p. 27.
82 O’Connor, op. cit., ch. 3.
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settlement’ between capital and labour in the wake of the Second World 
War and the balance of class forces since then. Since the last century the 
threat of popular discontent and mass struggle has led to important 
social concessions being made—for example unemployment insurance 
in the UK in 1911.83 At other times, social policies have been introduced 
by forward looking representatives of the dominant class to head off 
anticipated revolutionary demands. Many in Edwardian Britain were 
impressed by the success of the Bismarck model, among them Churchill, 
Chamberlain, Lloyd George and Balfour.84 This was particularly im-
portant in the reform of the 1940s: it must be remembered that the 
Beveridge Report, the White Paper on Full Employment and the 
Butler Education Act were all drawn up during war-time by a Coalition 
government. They were consciously seen as a necessary part of the 
war effort by integrating all classes and alleviating discontent.85 The 
need to secure working-class co-operation in rebuilding capitalism in 
the war-devastated countries of Europe led to the introduction of 
similar policies.
This however is not to deny the role of particular labour movements in 
extracting significant concessions from the state, over and above what 
it would wish to have granted. The relationship of class forces in 
Britain and the war-time radicalization must account for certain of the 
post-war social legislation: in particular the National Health Service 
and the comprehensive coverage of the National Insurance scheme.86
Since then the social services have increasingly been viewed by labour 
movements as an integral part of wages, to be defended and increased 
in the same way as money wages. They are a social wage provided col-
lectively by the state or some other body. There is an important differ-
ence here between countries relying on state vis-a-vis occupational 
provision. Many of the social security benefits in the EEC are provided 
by industry-wide semi-autonomous bodies with whom trade unions 
can directly negotiate, whereas in the UK, despite the growing import-
ance of occupational pension schemes, it is via its political relation with 
the state that the TUC and the labour movement exerts pressure.87 But 
whatever the administration of the scheme, the strength of working-
class pressure can roughly be gauged by the comprehensiveness and the 
level of the social benefits. The partial, haphazard and extremely unequal 
system of benefits in the US reveals the relative lack of power of its labour 
movement (and the absence of a party based on the trade unions) as 
much as the Federal nature of its state. On the other hand, the marked 
improvement in recent years reveals that both factors are changing.
Having established the role of these two major determinants of social 
policy, it is essential to point out that their interrelation in any particu-
lar policy decision is complex. For example, the original pressure for 
free secondary education for all in Britain undoubtedly originated in 
83 Gilbert, op. cit., chs. 1, 5; Hay, op. cit., pp. 47–54.
84 In 1895 Balfour declared: ‘Social legislation is not merely to be distinguished from 
Socialist legislation, but it is its most direct opposite and its most effective antidote.’ 
Quoted in V. George and P. Wilding, ‘Social values, social class and social policy’, 
Social and Economic Administration, vol. 6, no. 3, 1972.
85 Calder, op. cit., pp. 607–29.
86 Wedderburn, op. cit., pp. 142–3.
87 See for example T. Lynes, French Pensions, London 1967.
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the labour movement and among progressive educationalists. But what 
Maynard and Miliband call the ‘bias of the system’ ensured that these 
pressures were modified and deflected to suit the interests of the 
capitalist class. The tripartite system was consolidated and the raising 
of the school-leaving age repeatedly postponed until 1973.88 This bias 
operates in many ways even after legislation has been passed: its 
administration always offers great scope for discretion, benefits can 
fail to be adjusted for inflation, above all, the state determines what 
finance is available. At certain conjunctures the interests of the domin-
ant and dominated classes appear to converge, as for example with the 
expansion of higher education throughout the capitalist world in the 
1960s. But even then the ‘class alliance’ is a temporary one based on 
quite different goals and quickly dissipates. Another development is for 
the state to use certain social policies as a quid pro quo for wage restraint 
—the most open expression of this strategy being the present Labour 
government’s ‘Social Contract’.
So the interaction of long-term socio-economic trends, the political 
strategy of the capitalist state and the ongoing class struggle rule out 
any simple, single-factor explanation of social policies. Above all, it is 
essential to distinguish their concrete historical origins from the on-
going function they play within that particular social formation. Social 
policies originally the product of class struggle will, in the absence of 
further struggle, be absorbed and adapted to benefit the interests of the 
dominant classes. On the other hand, whatever their particular func-
tion for capital at any time, the fact that social services are also an 
integral part of the real wage level of the working class means that they 
are fought for in much the same way as money wages, in economic and 
political class struggle.
Escalating Costs
Once established, two important forces at work increase the costs of 
providing a given level of service or set of benefits over time. The first 
is the ‘relative price effect’: the tendency already noted for the costs of 
state services to rise faster than average. Though this is in part due to 
the ‘technical’ problems in raising productivity in the service sector, it 
is undoubtedly exacerbated in the case of state services by the absence 
of competitive pressure to reduce costs. The second has been the 
tendency for the dependent population to expand as a proportion of the 
total, raising the demand for many social services—from maternity 
allowances to geriatric services. In every OECD country without excep-
tion, for instance, the share of the elderly rose from 1955–69. This has 
given a powerful impetus to expenditure on social security benefits and 
education in particular.89 Population structure is not determined by 
socio-economic structure,90 but these trends have constituted an im-
88 D. Rubinstein and B. Simon, The Evolution of the Comprehensive Scbool 1926–1972, 
London 1973.
89 OECD, 1972, Tables A11, A12.
90 But neither are they entirely unrelated: the low inter-war birth rate which stemmed 
from the depressed economic conditions is an important factor accounting for the 
low proportion of adults of working age since the war. J. Thompson, ‘The growth of 
population to the end of the century’, Social Trends no. 1, 1970. G. Hawthorn (‘Pop-
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portant parameter for the last two decades and they will continue for at 
least another decade. These two factors account for much of the in-
crease in social expenditure—but not all. The OECD concluded: ‘These 
factors explain only part of the changes and inter-country differences 
observed. In most of the Common Market countries social security 
provisions in the fields of minimum old age pensions, survivor allow-
ances, finance or direct provision of medical services, medical provi-
sions and income maintenance of the disabled have been improved con-
siderably in substance and coverage.’91 The growth of social expendi-
ture is due to growing needs and costs and to real improvements in 
services.
3. Infrastructure services and economic aid
Collected together in this category are those expenditures which either 
(a) finance state provided means of production, or (b) directly assist 
private profitability and accumulation. The first group can be further 
divided into infrastructure expenditures and public corporation in-
vestment.
State expenditure on social infrastructure — posts, roads, water and 
sewerage, industrial estates, environmental and pollution control 
services, urban renewal etc.—is increasing in all countries. This is 
predominantly a response to the increasing scale and concentration of 
economic activity, to the accompanying urbanization and to the effect 
of the ‘cumulative causation’ mechanism on the growth and decline of 
regions.92 Many of these services are collective or quasi-collective, 
that is they cannot be sold in discrete units to individual purchasers, and 
so must be provided by the state or a semi-autonomous state body. 
Furthermore many such expenditures are large-scale and indivisible, 
requiring large sums of risk capital (e.g. the development of water 
supplies)—another reason for state provision or state aid to private pro-
viders. Lastly, the ‘highway lobby’ has clearly been important, at least 
in the US, in securing ever-growing road-development plans. In all, 
much of this is ‘complementary’ investment: whenever private de-
velopment takes place a whole range of public infra-structure services 
must be provided in order for it to function. But here too the initiative 
of the state manifests itself, for increasingly governments are using 
this social investment as part of physical planning or regional policy to 
help determine the location of economic activity rather than passively 
react to it.93 Of course, all these services are also utilized directly by 
households, which relates them to the social services as elements of 
variable capital, and some, such as pollution control, may be regarded 
as an unavoidable expense of private production and thus akin to 
luxury expenditures. But the absolute dependence of private produc-
tion on transport, water supplies, waste disposal etc., is testified by 
ulation policy: a modern delusion’, Fabian Tract 418, 1973) discusses the effects of 
economic conditions on the birth rate.
91 OECD, 1972, p. 77. It is far more difficult to assess whether they kept pace with the 
growing needs per head of the population.
92 For the analysis of the latter, see G. Myrdal, Economic Tbeory and Underdeveloped
Regions, London 1963, chs. 2, 3.
93 J. Cullingworth, Problems of an Urban Society, vol. 1, London 1972.
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their use of it; for example industry and agriculture consume over 
three quarters of the US water supply, and private consumers less than a 
quarter. In Japan, two thirds of public investment is in ‘industry sup-
port services’.94 It is for this reason that these expenditures are best 
analysed as the costs of social constant capital.
The nationalized industry sector differs from social infrastructure in 
that it produces commodities for sale: non-collective goods and ser-
vices, which could be produced by capitalist enterprise. The degree of 
public ownership varies between the major capitalist nations, from the 
US at one extreme to perhaps Italy (with the IRI and ENI) at the other, 
but in many countries rail and air transport, communication, coal, gas 
and electricity are now part of the public sector.95 These commodities 
are distinguished materially from many others by their character as 
basic inputs, that is goods and services which enter into the production 
of every other commodity. The role of many nationalized industries is 
to provide these basic inputs as cheaply as possible, thus aiding each 
national capital in its competition with other capitals. If the resulting 
deficits are financed from general taxation the cost is passed on to the 
working population whilst the benefits are reaped by the capitalist 
sector. But once again, we must distinguish the ongoing functions of 
any state activity from its origins. In the case of nationalization, several 
factors led to its extension in particular during the inter-war period and 
after the Second World War. Several basic industries such as railways 
and coal-mining were for various reasons unprofitable, yet their 
essential nature meant that state subsidy or control was necessary in the 
interests of the national capital as a whole. Generous compensation 
payments meant that the previous owners often benefited from 
nationalization. Last, and very important, social democratic govern-
ments were pressured from below to include some nationalization 
schemes in their legislation.96 These factors explain the virtual absence 
of nationalization in the USA: its economy emerged from the war 
strong and physically undamaged, there was no party organizationally 
based on the labour movement and the Federal system precluded, 
except at times of crisis such as the New Deal, the state independently 
initiating policies opposed to the interests of powerful sections of 
capital.
Public corporations are in most capitalist countries semi-autonomous 
bodies, typically relying on trading income to finance their operations, 
with or without generating a surplus. But capital expenditure is norm-
ally under the control of and partially financed by central government, 
and it is this item which is included in our wider definition of state 
expenditure. The growth of this expenditure will clearly depend on 
investment policies in fuel, transport and other areas, and on any in-
crease or contraction in the nationalized sector as a whole. For these 
reasons no clear trend is evident in this item. In the UK, public corpora-
tion investment has fluctuated little below one fifth of total investment 
since the war, but since 1968 it has declined year by year, partly as a 
94 O’Connor, p. 175; J. Fujiwara, ‘Japan: the end of the miracle’, Inprecor, 16–17, 
January 1975, p. 41.
95 A. Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, London 1965; O’Connor, ch. 7. 
96 Miliband, 1969, pp. 107–9.
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result of government financial and price-restraint policies.97 Trends in 
other countries will depend on the scope of the public sector: in France, 
where one half of the car industry is under public control, it is more 
dynamic than in West Germany. The Italian state holding companies 
of IRI and ENI permit greater flexibility and expansion of productive 
state investment, but in many ways this is more akin to state sub-
sidized private activity, the third area of expenditure to which we now 
turn.
State and Private Capital
State aid to private industry takes many forms and has grown apace 
particularly in the post-war period. Certain activities here are similar to 
infra-structure expenditures, for example state research and develop-
ment work, employment services etc. These constitute direct inputs to 
firms and reflect partly the increased scale and technical advance of pro-
duction, necessitating state financial aid even for some of the largest 
corporations in the world. But another form of state aid is perhaps of 
greater importance: these are a whole range of financial transfers to 
firms to raise profits and/or private investment. Examples include in-
vestment grants and other incentives, capital transfers, export incen-
tives, subsidies to agriculture and declining industries, etc.,—the range 
of mechanisms by which the state acts as the ‘guarantor of monopoly 
profits.’98 These benefits must not be separated from the effects of the 
tax system, which can also aid profits and investment in many ways: a 
corporation-tax allowance can have the same effect for the firm as an 
investment grant, but will not figure as an increase in state expenditure. 
In some countries, such as the UK and Japan, pension funds are an im-
portant source of investment capital for industry, but are increasingly 
subject to state control. Thus state requirements that all workers 
belong to an approved pension scheme in effect raises the rate of ‘forced 
savings’ from the working class in a way no different to a rise in social 
security contributions, but again they will not figure in statistics on 
state revenue and expenditure.99 Lastly, the state’s role as purchaser of 
goods (notably armaments) produced in the capitalist sector gives it 
great scope to aid private profitability. It can offer guaranteed profit 
mark-ups to the supplying industries, give generous allowances for 
research and development costs (themselves often financed by the 
state), discriminate in favour of domestic concerns and in many other 
ways indirectly boost private profitability and capital accumulation.100
For these and other reasons it is exceedingly difficult to quantify the 
amount of state financial aid to the capitalist sector. Different states 
rely on different methods. The immense government orders for the 
products of US industry, for example, permit the US state to channel 
public money to the private sector without the aid of special institu-
tions such as the IRC (and now the NEB) in Britain. But in all countries 
such aid is undoubtedly large and increasing, particularly over the last 
97 B. Sutcliffe, ‘Britain: free fall’, Inprecor 16–17, p. 18.
98 Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, op. cit., pp. 501–7.
99 This was the purpose of the Conservative government’s proposed State Reserve 
Pension scheme—see The Economist, 11 May 1974, p. 85. On Japan: Fujiwara, p. 41. 
100 Baran and Sweezy, ch. 7.
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decade. This has predominantly been caused by the decline in the rate of 
profit in many capitalist countries over this period, resulting from the 
raised tempo of the class struggle and intensifying competition between 
the capitalist economies. As a result, France is now subsidizing the 
Citröen car firm, Japan is subsidizing its ship-building industry and the 
UK is setting up the National Enterprise Board.101 When capitalist 
enterprises are unable to retain sufficient of their earnings to permit 
further capital accumulation, they must look to the state to supply 
these funds. The result is the complex series of arrangements by which 
the capitalist state today taxes money from the working class and trans-
fers it to profits. The battle over the burden of taxation and the com-
position of state expenditure is now as much a part of the class struggle 
as the ongoing battle over wages.
We have attempted above to categorize state expenditures according to 
their use-value in the productive process and to explain the variations 
in their size and the trends in their growth. The single most important 
conclusion which emerges is that an increasing proportion of the total 
(constituting therefore a fast-growing share of GNP) are productive ex-
penditures, producing inputs for the capitalist sector. The share of 
social services, infrastructure and accumulation expenditure is grow-
ing whilst that of unproductive luxury expenditure is declining. 
It is quite wrong therefore to regard the growth of the state as an unproductive 
‘burden’ upon the capitalist sector: more and more it is a necessary precondition 
for private capital accumulation. The implications and further contradic-
tions of this growth will be considered in section V below.
Lastly, it should be noted that we have adopted a disaggregated 
approach in explaining this growth. But this does not mean that the 
state exerts no control over expenditure in toto. On the contrary, the 
very size of the state sector necessitates an overall policy on state ex-
penditure and taxation. During the 1950s this chiefly took the form of 
anti-cyclical policies, using the budget to raise or lower total demand 
and economic activity. But in the 1960s attention shifted to longer-term 
forward planning of public expenditure by national governments.102
This was a response to the inefficiency of traditional stop-go methods 
of economic management and the shift towards greater state plan-
ning.103 It signified a growing awareness of the long-run productive 
contribution of state expenditure and of the consequent inefficiency of 
using it in particular as a weapon of short-term demand management. 
As a result, most governments now frame plans for the major com-
ponents of public expenditure three to five years ahead.
V. State Expenditure and the Current Crisis
The essential characteristic of the current world capitalist crisis is a 
combination of rampant inflation and a decline or absolute fall in the 
rate of accumulation and economic growth; a combination accurately 
labelled ‘slumpflation’. This crisis is not caused by the growth of state 
101 Inprecor, 16–17, pp. 37, 43.
102 On the US, O’Connor, ch. 3; on the UK, P. Clayton, ‘Accountability in govern-
ment expenditure’, National Westminster Bank Review, November 1971.
103 Warren, op. cit., p. 4.
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expenditure: it has far more fundamental roots. But the growing role of 
the state both reflects and exacerbates the present crisis. In order to 
elaborate on this interrelation, this section is divided into three parts: 
first, the view that this crisis is predominantly caused by the growth of 
state expenditure is criticized; second, the general nature and causes of 
the crisis are analysed; and third, the specific nature of the crisis of 
state expenditure in the UK is elaborated.
Unproductive labour and the State
The theory that ‘the growth of state expenditure must be seen as one of 
the key factors in an explanation of inflation’ rests upon the assertion 
that all or the greater part of state employees are ‘unproductive’.104 It is 
not intended to discuss Marx’s concept of productive and unproduc-
tive labour in detail here,105 but some comments are necessary to rebut 
this theory. For Marx, all labour which produces a use-value and sur-
plus-value is productive. State workers (excepting today those in 
nationalized industries) do not produce a commodity for exchange, 
hence do not produce surplus value (even though they perform surplus 
labour) and are therefore ‘unproductive’. They are supported out of the 
surplus value produced in the capitalist sector and transferred to them 
by taxation. Hence the greater are their numbers, the less surplus value 
remains to expand capital accumulation in the ‘productive’ sector. 
Recently, however, it has been appreciated that not all production 
workers in the capitalist sector contribute to the reproduction and 
accumulation of capital: those in Marx’s department III produce 
luxuries which do not enter as inputs into further rounds of production. 
A massive increase in armaments workers, for example, would lead to a 
contraction of capital accumulation in the economy as the material 
basis for further production is whittled away.106 Whilst one cannot 
agree that arms workers, etc., are for this reason unproductive from 
Marx’s viewpoint107 (they still labour to produce surplus value for 
their employer), this material distinction between workers producing 
elements of constant and variable capital on the one hand, and luxuries 
on the other, is crucial. It holds the key to discovering the productive 
contributions of state workers.
Rowthorn has recently demonstrated that state education workers may 
contribute to relative increases in surplus value in a way materially 
104 Yaffe, NLR 80, pp. 5o–2.
105 See I. Gough, ‘Marx’s theory of productive and unproductive labour’, NLR 76, 
1972; J. Harrison, ‘Productive and unproductive labour in Marx’s political economy’, 
CSEB Autumn 1973; P. Bullock, ‘Defining productive labour for capital’, CSEB
Autumn 1974; I. Gough and J. Harrison, ‘Unproductive labour and housework 
again’, CSEB February 1975.
106 Gough, NLR 76, pp. 64–7 (following Blake); Bullock, op. cit. See Mandel, 1968, 
ch. 10 on contracted reproduction.
107 The view of Bullock and Yaffe. Excluding circulation workers, with whom we 
are not here concerned, we are left with four groups of labourers, each of which 
plays a different role in the production process (see Gough and Harrison, op cit. p. 7):
Departments I and II Department III
Capitalist sector 1 2
Other sectors 3 4
In our view it is preferable to specify each category separately rather than indulge in 
further debates on which group is ‘really’ productive.
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identical to capitalist sector workers in departments I and II.108 The 
mechanism is as follows. So long as the labour they perform exceeds 
the labour embodied in the wage goods they consume, state employees 
perform surplus labour.109 However the taxes levied to pay teachers, etc., 
cover only their necessary, paid labour. In terms of embodied labour, 
there is a net flow from the state to the capitalist sector equivalent to 
their unpaid labour. ‘Surplus labour performed in education may be 
transferred to the capitalist sector where it appears as surplus value, 
apparently originating there. In reality, however, this surplus value is 
merely the converted form of surplus labour performed outside of the 
capitalist sector.’110 As a result, all state workers producing either com-
ponents of the real wage, for example social services, or elements of 
constant capital, for example research and development work, are in-
directly productive for capital. Thus increases in their productivity 
benefit the capitalist sector: taxes on capital can be reduced, or taxes on 
the working class, and hence their pre-tax wages, can be reduced. Either 
way post-tax profits rise. The labour-time to (directly or indirectly) 
maintain and reproduce labour power will have been lowered, and 
hence capital can appropriate more surplus labour.111
We arrive at an important conclusion: the growth of state employment 
and expenditure, much of which has been in social or ‘economic’ ser-
vices, has undoubtedly contributed to the production of surplus value 
and profits in the capitalist sector. In this sense their growth is not 
antagonistic to private capital accumulation; on the contrary, it is in-
creasingly a necessary prerequisite.112 Nor is it per se inflationary. We 
have already criticized the view that state expenditures cannot be 
entirely financed from taxation and must necessarily involve inflation-
ary borrowing. The recent growth of public sector deficits is a con-
junctural phenomenon following from the present slumpflation, not pre-
cipitating it (see below).
Growth of State Employment
On the other hand, Rowthorn does point out that growing public 
employment may inhibit capital accumulation in another way, by 
reducing the supply of labour available to the capitalist sector at times 
108 B. Rowthorn, ‘Skilled labour in the Marxist system’, CSEB Spring 1974. Also 
Gough and Harrison, op. cit.
109 This is likely given the national determination of wage levels for a particular skill 
and norms on average intensity of labour.
110 Rowthorn, CSEB 1974, p. 31.
111 Capital as a whole will also benefit from state provision of department III services 
(e.g. police): it will pay only their necessary labour costs compared with full labour 
time cost if the service were provided by private capital. The crucial difference is that 
the labour expended in this department will not augment surplus value in further 
rounds of production.
112 We have already mentioned the role of the Welfare State in buttressing the 
family. Since it has also been demonstrated that surplus labour performed by house-
wives can augment surplus value and profits in the capitalist sector, it would appear 
that state social services also aid capital accumulation in this way. (See J. Harrison, 
‘The political economy of housework’, CSEB Winter 1973.) However the same com-
petition over scarce labour applies—see below and Gough and Harrison, p. 5.
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of full employment.113 The continual expansion of such a low produc-
tivity, labour-intensive sector will in any case steadily reduce the re-
maining supply of labour, unless new sources, e.g., married women, 
continually replenish it. The alternative—of raising productivity in the 
state sector by means of speed-ups, performance targets, dilution of 
skills, etc.,—is increasingly tried but is unlikely to reduce its demand 
for labour appreciably. Does not this growing state service sector 
create an objective barrier to profitable accumulation of private capital? 
To answer this question it is necessary to divide state expenditure into 
transfer payments, purchases of goods and services from the capitalist 
sector, and the wages of state workers. We have already seen in section 
II that growing state transfers do not directly pre-empt resources avail-
able to the capitalist sector. State purchases of private output may well 
boost profits by providing secure, risk-free, high-profit markets for 
domestic firms. Only the last category of expenditure—wage payments 
for state employees—directly reduces the sphere of capitalist operations, 
though, in the case of indirectly productive workers, at the same time 
‘subsidizing’ the capitalist sector. In the UK and probably elsewhere the 
share of the state sector in total ‘value added’ has risen since the war: 
over one quarter of the labour force is employed in the public sector. 
Now such a trend will clearly reduce the share of profits in national 
income ceteris paribus: if the profit share in the capitalist sector remains 
constant, but the relative size of this sector declines, this is inevitable. 
However this does not mean that the rate of profit will be reduced by 
this fact alone—it may even rise. If the rate of growth is substantial, 
then the absolute size of the capitalist sector and, ceteris paribus, of the 
mass of profits will also increase. A threat to capital accumulation will 
only materialize when either the rate of growth in the economy as a 
whole is low or the ‘relative price effect’ (the relative rate of cost in-
flation in the state sector) is high. In this situation a growing share of 
state GNP may be necessary simply to maintain standards of service, 
and an absolute decline in private production may be needed for them 
to improve.114 The growth of the state sector will contribute, it is true, 
to a secular slowdown in the rate of growth, but this effect is attribut-
able to the growing share of services in all advanced economies, and is 
not a problem specific to the state sector.
To conclude then, state transfers and purchases from the capitalist 
sector may well have a net beneficial effect on its demand and profit 
levels, whilst State services in departments I and II will indirectly 
augment surplus value and private profit. At the same time during an 
economic upswing state employment may exacerbate labour shortages 
which inhibit private production. The slower growth of productivity 
in the state sector will necessitate a steady transfer of labour from the 
capitalist sector, but while this will tend, ceteris paribus, to a declining 
share of profits in national income, the rate of profit need not be affected. 
Only where the national rate of productivity growth is so low and/or 
the rate of growth of state employment is high will taxes on the private 
sector reduce absolutely wages and profit levels and thus threaten 
accumulation and exacerbate inflation. But in this case, as we shall 
113 Rowthorn, CSEB 1974, pp. 35–6.
114 See I. Gough, ‘Inflation and social policy’, in The Yearbook of Social Policy, ed. 
K. Jones, 1975.
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argue below, these pressures reflect rather than cause the phenomenon 
of slumpflation.
Political Consequences
This is not to argue of course that the interests of specific capitals are 
not threatened by a growth of state employment, or that there are no 
political consequences of the growth in state expenditure. The range 
of services performed by governments in advanced capitalist countries 
promises rich pickings to capitalist enterprises, whether health insurance 
companies, private schools or Securicor guards. We have already 
argued that the balance struck between direct state provision of a 
service, state finance of private provision or untrammelled private 
operation will depend on the balance of class forces and the political 
structure of each individual state. The above analysis demonstrates 
why the state, acting in the political interests of national capital as a 
whole, may decide to overrule the economic interests of specific 
capitals and directly provide certain services itself. The competitive 
position of that capitalist class may benefit in two ways: from the un-
paid labour of state employees (whereas purchases from other capitalists 
would necessarily include a profit element), and from the greater 
rationalization of production which state provision often entails. For 
these reasons there is as yet no concerted campaign to dismantle the 
NHS in Britain. Nevertheless, at certain conjunctures there will be some 
who would argue in favour of greater private provision, especially in 
the social services. The development of such a ‘social-industrial’ com-
plex, with wide government subsidies for private provision, may yet 
develop outside the USA.115
The growth of state expenditure has led to a marked political centraliza-
tion within the modern capitalist state, as O’Connor has observed in 
the US. Trends such as the removal of functions from local government 
and its reorganization into large areas, greater control over its current 
expenditure, centralization of public sector debt management, the 
setting up of new unelected ad hoc bodies, the growth of regional 
planning institutions and the centralization of control over public ex-
penditure within the executive: all these trends are observable within 
the UK as much as the US.116 Many of these are responses to a profound 
crisis afflicting local government, squeezed between expanding services 
and fast growing costs on the one hand, and a static local revenue on 
the other. At both local and national level growing state expenditures 
have thus led to important shifts in the institutions and processes of 
bourgeois democracy.117 But here, as in the economic sphere, they are 
reflections of more profound changes.
The Current Crisis
It is not possible here to present a comprehensive account and analysis 
of the current crisis: instead we shall concentrate solely on what we 
115 O’Connor, pp. 51–8.
116 See for example H. Page, ‘Local government in decline’, Three Banks Review, 90, 
1971.
117 Warren, NLR 72, p. 29; O’Connor, ch. 3.
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believe to be its key determinants. The inflationary crisis of the world 
capitalist economy is the cumulative result (a) of the changed balance of 
class forces on a world scale since the Second World War, and (b) of the 
uneven development of the capitalist nations since then. We shall deal 
with each of these in turn, since the fundamental cause is the heightened 
bargaining power (economically and politically) of the Western labour 
movements following a prolonged period of near full employment. The 
generation of inflation under these circumstances has been well 
analysed by Devine.118 In brief, capitalists cannot prevent workers from 
obtaining money wage increases in excess of the rate of productivity 
growth and workers cannot prevent capitalists from raising prices. The 
result is chronic inflation. The growth of state expenditure superimposes 
on this fundamental conflict between capital and labour a further con-
flict which gives an added impetus to inflation. ‘The competing claims 
of private consumption, investment, public provision, military expendi-
ture, the foreign balance, have exceeded the availability of resources. 
Efforts to commandeer resources for one use, if not acquiesced in by 
those from whom the resources are to be taken, call forth responses 
designed to frustrate them which for the most part manifest themselves 
in higher prices. Thus, if the state increases direct taxation on personal 
incomes or indirect taxation, in order to increase social provision or to 
stimulate private investment via reductions in corporate taxation or to 
make room for a shift of resources into the balance of payments, workers 
will seek to offset the effect of this on their private consumption through 
higher money wages; if capitalists raise prices in order to raise profits 
to finance increased investment or if the terms of trade deteriorate and 
prices rise, workers will again seek to offset this through higher money 
wages; if workers obtain higher money wages, in order to offset in-
creased taxes or increased prices or simply to assert their claim to a 
higher standard of living and a larger share of what is produced, they 
will commandeer a larger proportion of resources for private consump-
tion than would otherwise be the case and the state or capitalists will 
seek to offset this through higher taxes or higher prices. Chronic in-
flation is the result of a situation in which available resources are in-
sufficient to meet claims on them and claimants cannot be prevented 
from bidding—workers via higher money wages, capitalists via higher 
prices, the state via higher taxes or borrowing from the banking 
system.’119
This model of contemporary capitalism does not of course imply that 
the state is independent of capital; rather it is premised upon that rela-
tive autonomy that we emphasized in section III. Finally, against 
arguments that this theory puts the ‘blame’ for inflation on the working 
class, we may agree with Devine: ‘It is unscientific to attempt to attri-
bute “blame” or “responsibility” to different classes . . . . Inflation is a 
product of the capitalist system in its present stage of state monopoly 
capitalism.’120
Thus structural conflict within advanced capitalism explains the 
chronic inflation experienced since the Second World War. Together 
118 P. Devine, ‘Inflation and Marxist theory’, Marxism Today, March 1974.
119 Ibid., pp. 85–6. Mandel and Warren suggest the same analysis in their recent 
debate, NLR 87–8, 1974.
120 Devine, op. cit., p. 92.
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with the growth of the power of labour movements and of state ex-
penditure, it explains the acceleration of inflation in the late 1960s. But 
we have yet to discover the link between this and the current world 
recession. This has followed the steady decline in investment expendi-
ture over each cycle since the early 1960s, so that in the 1970–73 cycle 
investment for the first time ever rose less rapidly than output in the 
OECD countries.121 This followed the fundamental decline in profit-
ability which occurred in several countries in the 1970s, itself a reflec-
tion of growing labour strength at a time of heightened international 
competition.122 The fundamental factor determining whether capitalists 
will advance money capital and expand output is their view of the ex-
pected rate of profit. If the past rate of profit has been falling and if they 
hold a pessimistic assessment of the balance of class forces, then the 
rate of private investment will fall. This is precisely what has happened 
since 1973 in several major capitalist countries, and this defines the 
current inflationary recession as a qualitative crisis of capitalist pro-
duction.
Of course, the separate nation states can intervene in this situation to 
boost the rate of investment. If the rate of exploitation is being reduced 
the state can indirectly raise it by reducing post-tax wages and funnel-
ling the money back to the capitalist sector. The share of taxes paid by 
corporations was reduced in the OECD area between 1955 and 1969, and 
the burden of rising state expenditure shifted onto the working class by 
means of direct and indirect taxes. Direct state aid to private industry 
has also risen over the long term, but in 1974 it rose precipitately in 
many countries.123 However this state aid will in turn fuel the rate of 
inflation. Given the balance of class forces a rise in taxes on wages or on 
goods and services will lead to higher, pre-emptive wage claims, whilst 
attempts to reduce the ‘social wage’, by means of cuts in state social 
spending, will also be resisted. As a result, in all major countries state 
borrowing and public sector deficits have mushroomed in 1974 and 
1975.124 (However the rising unemployment in all countries suggests 
this has not been sufficient to offset falling private investment and con-
sumption.) The twin characters of the current crisis—rampant in-
flation and worldwide slump—thus both reflect the balance of class 
forces and the attempts of the state to help rectify the resulting con-
tradictions.
Uneven Development
But if this is the most general explanation of the current crisis, its 
particular national manifestations are circumscribed by the second 
factor: the operation of the ‘law’ of uneven development. The extent to 
which the class conflict results in inflation and/or pressure on profits 
will depend on the underlying strength of each economy. In the post-
121 By less than 4 per cent and 41−2 per cent respectively: J. Harrison, ‘Capitalist crisis 
and economic recession’, unpublished.
122 See the analyses in Inprecor, 16–17, January 1975; by Wolf on Germany, p. 30, 
Valentin and Leucate on France, p. 36. For a comparative survey Glyn and Sutcliffe, 
op. cit., chs. 2, 3 and appendix G.
123 Inprecor, 16–17, pp. 37, 43.
124 The Economist, 15 March 1975, p. 77; 29 March 1975, p. 81; 5 April 1975, p. 65.
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war epoch this uneven development has predominantly taken the form 
of differences in productivity growth and in the balance of payments. 
Capitalist states with high rates of growth and a strong payments posi-
tion (such as Japan and West Germany) have been in the strongest 
position to reconcile conflicting claims on resources without incurring 
high rates of inflation. Weak countries, notably the UK, have much less 
room for manoeuvre. But these differences are in part determined once 
again by the relative strengths of the national labour movements: for 
example, their ability to resist redundancies, changes in work practices 
etc. The uneven strength of different economies is indicated by national 
data on profitability. Only in the US, Benelux and Italy did the rising 
share of wages in the 1950s and 1960s have the same adverse effect on 
profits as in the UK—elsewhere it did not even match the movement of 
the self-employed into wage employment.125 The delay in recovery of 
the labour movements in Germany and Japan postponed any decline 
in profitability there till the 1970s.126 The relative weakness of labour 
movements in several countries may permit the rate of exploitation to 
be raised in 1975 under the threat of high unemployment: in the US
real wages have fallen for over two years in succession, current wage 
increases in Germany are down to 7 per cent, in France and Japan im-
portant public sector strikes have been defeated.127 In all these countries 
the rate of inflation is being reduced, profitability restored and the 
basis laid for further expansion. Only in Italy and the UK among the 
major OECD countries is this not the case. The strength of the labour 
movement and the weakness of the economy are intimately related in 
both cases, though in Italy it is the moderation of the trade unions and 
the Communist Party on which the state mainly relies.128 For this 
reason, one should strictly-speaking refer to a generalized recession of 
the international capitalist economy, but not of a generalized crisis. This 
term should be reserved for Britain, Italy and any other country where 
the balance of class forces prevents the rate of exploitation being raised 
and the dynamic of capitalist accumulation re-established, unless their 
labour movements are first seriously weakened.
However if there is not yet a generalized world economic crisis, the 
consequences of uneven development may already be laying the basis 
for one. One manifestation of this has been the decline of US hegemony 
(in the economic and political, if not the military, sphere), the growth 
of regional economic groupings, and the growing challenge of the 
EEC and Japan. Already these trends have severely dislocated the 
Bretton Woods international monetary system, and have hindered 
decisive leadership of the world capitalist economy.129 A further con-
sequence has been the synchronization of the world trade-cycle follow-
ing the large US trade deficits and the wages explosions of the late 
1960s. Instead of a boom in some countries offsetting a recession in 
others, all major OECD countries are now moving together and the 
125 Glyn and Sutcliffe, op. cit. appendix G.
126 Ibid., pp. 98–9. For Germany see E. Altvater et al, ‘On the analysis of imperialism 
in the metropolitan countries: the West German example’, CSEB Spring 1974, pp. 6ff. 
127 The Economist, 29 March 1975, p. 81; 5 April 1975, pp. 64, 69, 80–2.
128 The Economist, 29 March 1975, pp. 69–75
129 E. Mandel, ‘The generalized recession of the international capitalist economy’, 
Inprecor, 16–17, pp. 13–14.
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trade cycle is becoming dangerously destabilized.130 This accounted 
for the commodity and oil price explosions during the 1971–73 boom, 
and this is now accounting for the severity of the 1974–75 slump. The 
consequent under-utilization of capital has been a further factor de-
pressing profits and inhibiting investment. So the operation of the law 
of uneven development within the post-war context is creating fresh 
contradictions which will tax (but not necessarily defeat) the bourgeois 
political order in the coming years. But the underlying factor, and one 
which has thrown up an open economic and political crisis today in at 
least Britain and Italy, is the economic strength of the working class 
in the post-war epoch.
State Expenditure and the British Crisis
The share of profits in Britain fell from 21 per cent in 1964 to 12 per 
cent in 1970 to 4 per cent in the second quarter of 1974, whilst the rate 
of pre-tax profit fell from 14 per cent to 10 per cent to 5 per cent.131 The 
urgent necessity to raise the rate of exploitation has been clear to 
capital for several years. This is not the place to go into the alternative 
strategies adopted.132 The victory of the 1974 Miners’ strike and the 
election of a Labour government in this context represented a strategic 
defeat for the British state and the capitalist class. The attempt to re-
strain wages via the Social Contract is now in ruins. Britain has entered 
its most critical post-war crisis with the organizational and political 
strength of the working class at a new height and the bourgeois political 
order in a state of unprecedented disarray: indeed this combination 
defines the contemporary crisis in Britain. With this framework in 
mind let us now consider the economic and political role of state ex-
penditure.
State expenditure continued to grow during the years of the 1970–74
Conservative government, but due to a recognition of the origins of 
the 1969–70 wages explosion and a need to reduce the rate of inflation, 
this was accompanied by a reduction in taxation. The fast growth in 
public expenditure projected in 1971 and 1972 was predominantly to 
reduce unemployment and raise investment and to restrain price rises 
by letting nationalized industry deficits grow.133 But at the same time, 
as part of its general offensive against labour (the Industrial Relations 
Act, the 1972 pay freeze and stage 2), the government attempted to cut 
back the growth of social expenditure, notably via the Housing Finance 
Act and the cuts of £500 million and £1180 million in May and 
December 1973. Nevertheless the growth of social spending up to then 
was considerable and contributed to the unprecedented rise in real 
incomes from 1971–73. This attempt to stimulate the economy by 
means of public investment resulted in a rapid growth of the public 
sector borrowing requirement to over £4 billion in 1973. It is likely 
130 The Economist, 12 April 1975, pp. 79–8o.
131 The most recent survey is by A. Glyn, ‘Notes on the profit squeeze’, CSEB, 
February 1975.
132 See A. Jones, ‘The economic impasse of British imperialism’, Inter-Continental
Press, 5 August 1974; and J. Harrison, ‘British capitalism in 1973 and 1974: the 
deepening crisis’, CSEB Spring 1974.
133 White Papers on Public Expenditure: Cmnd. 5178 (1972), p. 9; Cmnd. 5519 (1973), 
p.7.
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then that the government’s attempts to combat inflation only led to its 
regeneration by another route. In the absence of any wholly success-
ful reduction in real wages (via money wages and/or the ‘social wage’) 
this was inevitable.
But even this partial success was destroyed by the 1974 Miners’ strike. 
The incoming Labour government extended social benefits as its part 
of the Social Contract with the trade union movement. The major 
elements here were food subsidies, the freeze on rents and pension in-
creases,134 although the cuts in health and education spending were not 
restored. Grants to local authorities were raised to offset rate increases. 
Militant action among public sector workers, traditionally low paid 
and less under the control of union bureaucracies, gained large wage 
rises and further raised public expenditure.135 With the sudden onset of 
the international recession the government intervened to channel aid 
towards the capitalist sector by reducing payments of corporation tax, 
relaxing price controls, setting up the National Enterprise Board, etc. 
All this has resulted, in a massive growth in public expenditure to 
£54 billion in 1975–76 equivalent to 60 per cent of GNP. Despite the 
operation of ‘fiscal drag’ this has opened up an enormous public sector 
borrowing requirement equal to 10 per cent of GNP.136
Budget deficits of this size are not of themselves inflationary in a deep 
recession. Measured in terms of its effect on aggregate demand the 
public sector deficit has risen from 9 per cent of GNP in 1971 to 12 per 
cent following the November 1974 Budget. ‘In real terms the budget is 
not increasing the pressure on real resources in the economy—a fact 
which is in any case obvious from the unemployment figures.’137 On 
the contrary, the first Labour Budget in March 1974 was savagely 
deflationary. In any case large public sector deficits are inevitable at the 
present time given the large oil deficit in the balance of payments of 
most OECD countries. The inability of the corporate sector to run a 
financial deficit for any length of time (the November 1974 Budget in 
the UK was designed to correct this) means that balance of payments 
deficits must be offset by government deficits if the economy is not to 
move into a cumulative recession.138 This is further revealed by the 
low rate of increase of the money supply at the present time: in the UK
at a rate less than half that of price increases. As the National Institute 
remarked, the budget deficits ‘do however reflect the serious problems 
of inflation and the balance of payments situation—but we think these 
problems have other causes.’139 The basic cause is the underlying 
balance of class forces in Britain and the inability of the Labour 
government so far decisively to challenge the trade union movement. 
Given the need to channel aid to the capitalist sector to prevent a total 
134 See Gough, Inflation and social policy, op. cit., for a detailed study.
135 The National Institute Economic Review (February 1975, p. 16) calculates that this 
added £400–700m to public expenditure in 1974–75.
136 £71_2 billion in 1974–75 and £9 billion in 1975–76. The Economist, 19 April 1975, 
p. 80 ff.
137 NIER February 1975, pp. 14–15. This was before the big upward revision revealed 
in the April Budget.
138 NIER February 1975, p. 15. For a good general analysis see D. Kern, ‘Public 
sector deficits’, National Westminster Bank Review, May 1974.
139 NIER, ibid., p. 15.
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collapse of investment, to maintain public investment, to raise certain 
social benefits as part of the Social Contract, and to avoid any further 
increases in taxation for fear of their repercussions on inflation and 
profitability, the result is inevitably a growing gap between state ex-
penditure and revenue. The present Budget deficit passively reflects the 
alignment of class forces which have generated the current inflationary 
crisis: it is not itself an active cause of that crisis.
The Struggle over Social Expenditure
The only solution for the capitalist class and for the state representing 
its political interests, is a decisive rise in the rate of exploitation. This 
would permit a reduction in the rate of inflation, a rise in profit expecta-
tions and would release resources for investment and exports. To 
achieve this two separate strategies are identifiable, though in practice 
both are normally used in combination. The first is some form of 
wages freeze, which would directly achieve the three objectives above. 
The second is to deliberately allow unemployment to rise in order to 
indirectly bring down the rate of wage increases, though the unemploy-
ment level necessary would probably need to be extremely high by post-
war standards. To achieve this without fuelling inflation, large cuts in 
public expenditure would be essential. Within the total of public 
spending, aid to private capital would need to be maintained and cuts in 
military spending, though they cannot be ruled out, would not suffice. 
The burden would necessarily be borne by the social services, and this 
for two reasons. First, they constitute the most dynamic area of state 
expenditure. Second, they comprise the ‘social wage’ of the working 
class, and a cut in this would be interpreted by capitalists at home and 
abroad as a deliberate government decision to reduce living standards 
and raise the rate of exploitation. An integral component of this 
second strategy would therefore be an attack on social expenditure. In 
fact, this has already begun with a sharp cutback in planned local 
authority expenditure announced in early 1975.140 But this ‘crisis of 
social expenditure’ has no autonomous dynamic: it is an element of the 
general crisis analysed above.
There are then powerful pressures on the British state to raise the rate 
of exploitation and thus permit the extended reproduction of capital. 
But of course precisely what defines the crisis is the powerful opposition 
of contradictory pressures: the ability and determination of the working 
class to resist such a rise.141 This is not the place to analyse the strengths 
and weaknesses of the British labour movement: its tremendous econo-
mic power is intimately related to its reformism and economism. What 
is clear is that any attempt to impose a wage freeze or substantial un-
employment will be vigorously resisted. However the specific strength 
of opposition to any cuts in social expenditure should be noted, for the 
growth in the numbers of state employees has itself created a new force 
within the working class of all advanced capitalist countries. The 
organization of public sector workers has proceeded apace in recent 
140 Public Expenditure to 1978–79, Cmnd. 5879, 1975, p. 9 and the Chancellor’s April 
Budget statement, The Economist, 19 April 1975, p. 11.
141 J. Harrison, 1975, unpublished.
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years; and it is likely that the rate of pay rises they have obtained have 
exceeded those in the private sector. Perhaps more important, state 
employees by the very nature of their employment tend to inject 
qualitative, political issues into their struggle to protect and improve 
their terms and conditions of service.142 Thus in the UK the public 
sector union NUPE has been to the forefront in the attempt to end private 
pay beds within the NHS. This is related to the traditional autonomy 
enjoyed by certain professions, for example doctors, lecturers and 
social workers. Questions of the content of education, the aims of 
social work, the structure of medical practice are increasingly fused 
with day-to-day trade-union struggle within the State sector. Other 
factors at work here include the growing relation with organizations of 
state clients (claimants unions, education pressure groups), the direct 
political control periodically exercised by governments over public 
sector pay levels, and the weaker control of the trade union bureau-
cracy over some of these newly organized groups. These forces mean 
that public sector workers will form an increasingly important and 
effective bloc opposing cuts in social expenditure as a solution to the 
contemporary crisis in the UK. At the same time, the increasing recog-
nition of the importance of the social services within the real wage has 
prompted other sections of workers to take action in their defence. In 
1974 miners in the Yorkshire coalfields struck in support of an in-
crease in nurses’ pay, in order to protect the NHS. These actions have 
been echoed at the base of the Labour Party, the most notable struggle 
being the long-standing refusal of the councillors at Clay Cross to im-
plement the Housing Finance Act. To summarize then, the forces 
opposed to cutbacks in social expenditure as a solution to the British 
crisis would appear to be gaining strength over time.
If our analysis of the current crisis in Britain is correct, we cannot at 
the time of writing predict its outcome. Though at some stage there 
will be a decisive test of strength, it is possible that beforehand state 
policies will contain simultaneously concessions to the labour move-
ment plus attempts to weaken it. The political reflection of these con-
flicts will have a semi-autonomous impact on their outcome. The 
crisis will impose tremendous strains on the Labour government, 
caught as it is between the contradictory need to raise living standards 
in order to maintain credibility with its political base, and the need to 
lower them in order to work towards solving the crisis. The crisis of 
social expenditure will exacerbate this fundamental contradiction, for a 
distinguishing feature of social democratic reformism since the war has 
been the Welfare State itself: the offer of social reforms and services in 
exchange for a certain measure of trade union co-operation with the 
state. At the present time this quid pro quo is institutionally enshrined in 
the Social Contract. The depth of the British crisis probably requires 
the simultaneous adoption of wage controls, deflation and cuts in social 
expenditure: all of which will precipitate an internal crisis within 
British social democracy. The outcome will thus depend not only on 
the reaction of the working class in mass struggle, but also on the 
political reflection of these conflicts. The outcome of the current 
crisis, no less than its origins, turns on the total class struggle: a fusion 
of economic, political and ideological struggle.
142 For a fruitful discussion see O’Connor, op. cit., ch. 9. 
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